Brachos Daf 41

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HALACHAH FROM THE DAF

Wine and other drinks

The Gemora cites the statement of Rabbi Chiya that bread exempts all foods, and wine exempts all drinks.

Tosfos (Berachos 41b Yayin) says that just as we do not rule like his statement about bread, as it only exempts foods related to the meal itself, so we do not rule like h is statement about wine.

The Rosh and Rabbeinu Yonah disagree, and rule like Rabbi Chiya’s statement about wine.

The Shulchan Aruch (OH 174:2) rules like Rabbi Chiya’s statement about wine, saying that it exempts other drinks from both the brachahs before and after them.

The poskim discuss the details of when this applies, including whether one had to have the other drinks in mind or even present when drinking the wine. See Mishnah Berurah and Biur Halachah for a deeper discussion of the various positions on this question.

The Derech Hachayim, cited by the Mishnah Berurah (3) notes that one must have actually drank from the wine, and not just heard someone else say the brachah. Although hearing one say the brachah suffices to fulfill the obligation of kiddush, it does not suffice to exempt other drinks.

Making a Brachah

on a Tofel before the Ikar

The Rema (212:1) rules that if a person wants to make a brachah on the tofel first in order to eat the ikar, he only makes a she’hakol on the tofel since it is forbidden to eat anything in this world without saying a brachah. For example, if a person’s sole reason in eating a cracker is so he won’t drink whiskey on an empty stomach and feel ill, he should make a she’hakol on the cracker.

The source of this halachah is the Terumas HaDeshen who explains that any tofel loses its brachah completely, since it is part of the ikar. The source of the Terumas Hadeshen is from the Gemora of the radish and olive. Since the radish was eaten first, it exempts even the olive, which is one of the seven species, from a brachah. We see from this that the tofel has no importance whatsoever, thereby losing its brachah. However, if the tofel is eaten first, then its brachah is she’hakol since we must make a brachah prior to receiving pleasure form anything.

The Magen Avrohom argues, that the Or Zarua, who the Terumas Hadeshen is based on, only means that we say she’hakol when the ikar is also she’hakol, since the tofel receives the brachah of ikar, which is she’hakol. If the tofel is a different brachah and it is eaten first, of course, we must make the appropriate brachah.

Let us consider the following: A person wants to take an apple out of the apple-danish to make a ha’eitz, is he allowed to?

According to the Rema, since the tofel has no brachah, there is absolutely no reason to take out the tofel first because you are causing an unnecessary brachah of she’hakol.

Perhaps one could ask that since he wants to make a brachah on the apple first, then it is considered chaviv, preferred, and the Rema rules that something chaviv is not tofel!

There are two opinions what chaviv is. One opinion says that chaviv is a food that one always prefers. The Rambam understands that chaviv is that which one wants now. According to the first opinion, there is nothing to discuss, unless one always prefers apples to mezonos. According to the Rambam, chaviv does not contradict the halachah of tofel, since the food is tofel, it is not the one that he wants to make a brachah on first.

According to the Magen Avrohom, a food that is tofel gets the brachah of the ikar. If so, saying a ha’eitz on the apple is the wrong brachah. In truth, the Magen Avrohom (168), by the halachah of eating pas haba’ah b’kisnin during a meal, discusses whether one could take out a piece of an apple out of a danish and make ha’eitz on it. He rules that it is an unnecessary brachah. The Magen Avrohom himself is of the opinion that all foods during a meal are considered tofel to the bread except fruits etc. In that case, the fruit is brought as part of the meal. Therefore, it has no brachah of its own. It is not recommended to take the tofel and say a brachah first.

Eating on Yom Kippur

The Gemara states that the source for any measurements, interpositions and partitions are all Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai, oral laws given to Moshe at Sinai that have no Scriptural basis. Rashi cites two examples of measurements, one being the olive-measure for most forbidden foods, and second, the date-measure for eating on Yom Kippur.

There is an interesting discussion regarding the definition of the prohibition to eat on Yom Kippur. The question raised is as follows: Is the prohibition defined as eating per se, and the minimum measure that was established was the equivalent of the size of a date because that is what alleviates the hunger, or perhaps the prohibition is that one cannot alleviate his hunger, which is generally accomplished by eating a food that is the size of a date.

Although this may seem to be a question of semantics, this query actually has some serious halachic implications. Let us consider the following scenario: What would happen if one ate slightly less than the equivalent of a date right before Yom Kippur and he is still somewhat hungry. After Yom Kippur begins, he eats a little bit more and that eating combines with what he ate before Yom Kippur to alleviate his hunger. This person has alleviated his hunger on Yom Kippur, but he has done so without eating the entire forbidden measurement of food.

The Ksav Sofer writes that in such a situation, one has indeed transgressed Yom Kippur. It is clear that the Ksav Sofer maintains that the prohibition is that one cannot alleviate his hunger and the prohibition is not the eating per se.

In a similar vein, Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky, in his sefer Achiezer, discusses intravenous feeding on Yom Kippur. If the prohibition is eating per se, then feeding intravenously would be permitted. If the prohibition is that one cannot alleviate his hunger, then feeding intravenously may be prohibited as well.

That Little Piece of Bread

by the Sink in Restaurants

It is common in restaurants to leave a bowl of bread pieces by the netilas yadayim sink, so people can say hamotzi and exempt all the food they are eating with one brachah. Does this help?

The Magen Avrohom writes that if a person does not really want to eat bread, but rather, he just wants to exempt the other foods, it does not work. Since the whole reason that bread exempts food during the meal is because the foods are tofel to it, as they are considered accompaniments (like Rashi), if the bread is really not the main part of the meal, and he doesn’t even want to really eat it, then it doesn’t exempt anything else.

The Aruch Hashulchan argues that we don’t use the understanding of Rashi, rather, food during a meal is exempt from a brachah since it is a part of the meal. Sitting down and making hamotzi begins a meal, and anything that is brought during the meal is exempted, since it is part of the meal. Foods that are not brought to be part of the main meal, i.e. the meat and potatoes, like fruit, we make a brachah. If we eat bread to make a seudah, it should exempt everything.

Reb Moshe Feinstein writes that even still, if a person eats less then a k’zayis of bread, it does not create a seudah, and it will not exempt the other foods from brachos. Therefore, if a person wants to exempt other foods from brachos, he should be sure to eat at least a k’zayis, about half a piece of bread, rather than a little piece (unless you take several of them). [The purpose of the bread by the sink may also be in order that one should eat bread immediately after his washing, and that there shouldn’t be an extended interruption between the two.]

Brachos Daf 39

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Drinking Coffee Heated

By A Gentile

The Gemora states: Anything which is normally eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking. (Water does not need to be heated and therefore should not be subject to this prohibition.)

The Radvaz in his teshuvos (3:637) writes: It is permitted to drink coffee heated by a gentile and it is not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking; even though coffee cannot be eaten in its raw state, it is something which does not eaten at a king’s table as an accompaniment to the bread and therefore it is permitted. There is also no concern that they cooked something forbidden in those pots beforehand, since it is well known that they have designated utensils for the coffee (because otherwise, the taste of the coffee would be ruined). He concludes: One should not drink coffee in the accompaniment of gentiles since that will result in many transgressions.

It is brought like that in the Hagahos from the Maharikash (114) as well. He rules that one should be stringent about drinking coffee in a coffee house of gentiles, similar to the halachah regarding wine and beer. Furthermore, it is considered a moishev leitzim (i.e. a session of jesters) and should be avoided.

The Knesses Hagedolah in his sefer Ba’ey Chayei (Y”D 145) disagrees and maintains that coffee heated by a gentile is prohibited to drink. He states: Anything which is eaten or drunk at the royal table by itself, even if it does not come as an accompaniment to the bread is subject to the prohibition of gentile cooking. Furthermore, the requirement that the food must be something that accompanies bread on the royal table is limited to food items, not liquids. He continues: “Even though when I was younger, I would rely on those who ruled that it is permitted, I have now investigated it thoroughly and cannot find a reason for its permission and therefore I refrain from drinking it.” He found that the Arizal prohibited drinking coffee heated by a gentile. He concludes that he is not prohibiting it for the public, but he himself refrained from drinking it.

Pri Chadash (114:6) writes that it is permitted based on Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 31b): Wheat is nullified in water in regards to reciting the blessing of shehakol, so too it is nullified in regards to the prohibition against gentile cooking. Similarly, the coffee is nullified in the boiling water that it is being cooked with and it is therefore not subject to the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Teshuvos Beis Yehudah (Y”D 21) objects to the reasoning of the Pri Chadash. Our Gemora rules: The proper blessing on water which was cooked with vegetables is ha’adamah and this is the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (205:2). The reasoning is based on the fact that this is the common method for these vegetables. Accordingly, the blessing on coffee should be ha’adamah as well. Our custom of reciting shehakol on coffee is astounding, but we cannot add to this novelty by being lenient with the prohibition against gentile cooking.

Rabbi Yaakov Emden in his sefer Mor U’ktziah (204) writes that actually the proper blessing on coffee should be ha’eitz since it is a fruit from a tree and that was the original intent of those that planted the coffee beans; to drink from the liquid. He concludes that the custom is to recite a shehakol anyway, similar to date beer and barley beer.

DAILY MASHAL

Bread Inside Bread

Our Gemora says that he who has a whole loaf of barley bread and a slice of wheat bread “puts the slice inside the loaf and (says the berachah and) cuts it.” Rashi had a version of the Gemora which says “he puts the slice under the loaf” and apparently this is the correct version as how can one put a slice inside a whole loaf? However, some justify the version “inside the loaf” and explain that the bread in Chazal’s era in their region resembled pita. Pita is quite elastic and can be folded to put the slice inside it (Milon Arami, Melamed).

Brachos Daf 38

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Fruit Juice and Cooking

The Gemora says that one says She-hakol on date honey, as this ‎juice is considered only an excretion. ‎

The Rosh (12) cites the Behag who limits this statement to date ‎honey mixed with water, but pure date honey is still Ha’eitz. ‎

All other Rishonim disagree, and the Shulchan Aruch (202:8) ‎therefore rules that only the juice of grapes and olives are ‎considered the fruit itself, and all others are She-hakol. ‎

The Gemora rules that cooked vegetables, which are normally ‎eaten cooked, and their broth are Ha’adamah. ‎

The Rosh (18) asks why this broth retains the brachah of ‎vegetable, while the juice squeezed from a fruit is She-hakol. ‎

The Rosh suggests that what is extracted from a fruit by cooking ‎is more a part of the fruit than its juice. Therefore, it is possible ‎that one would say Ha’eitz on water in which a fruit was soaked, ‎as that is tantamount to cooking. ‎

The Rashba disagrees, and explains that cooking vegetables is ‎the normal way of preparing them, and therefore the product ‎retains the brachah. However, fruit is not normally squeezed for ‎its juice, and therefore the juice is She-hakol. ‎

The Rosh (Responsa 4:15) says that the broth of cooked ‎vegetables is Ha’adamah only when the cooking is normally ‎done in order to eat the vegetables. ‎

The Chazon Ish (OH 33:5) says that juice of oranges grown for ‎juicing would be Ha’eitz, since this is the normal way of eating it. ‎

In the case of fruit soaked or cooked in water, the Shulchan ‎Aruch (202:10) cites both the Rosh (on the Gemora) and ‎Rashba’s position, while in the case of fruit juice, the Shulchan ‎Aruch (205:2) rules like the Rosh.‎

See Ve’sen Brachah (Rabbi Bodner) page 438, note 29.1 for a ‎discussion about the brachah on clear borscht.‎

Mashed Fruits

The Gemora rules that terima – mashed fruit retains its original ‎brachah. ‎

The Rishonim differ in their definition of a mashed fruit. ‎

Rashi implies that terima is only partially mashed. ‎

The Terumas Hadeshen (29) says that it still retains some of its ‎original form, and is recognizable. ‎

The Rambam (Brachos 8:4) says that one says Ha’eitz even if one ‎made a cake out of figs. ‎

The Mishnah Berurah (202:42) rules that as long as the fruit is ‎recognizable, one should say Ha’eitz, but otherwise She-hakol. ‎

The Ben Ish Hai (Rav Pe’alim 2:28) and Rav Ben Tzion Abba Shaul ‎maintain that this is what the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch say ‎as well, while Rav Ovadia Yosef (Chazon Ovadia brachos p. 132) ‎says that they say that one would say Ha’eitz even if the fruit ‎isn’t recognizable. ‎

See Yabia Omer (7:29 and addendums, p. 427) for a discussion ‎of falafel balls.‎

Eating One Fruit

The Gemora asks how Rabbi Yochanan could have said a brachah ‎acharonah on one olive, as it was less than a k’zayis, once he ‎removed the pit. The Gemora answers that it was a large olive, ‎leaving a k’zayis without the pit. ‎

Tosfos (39a batzar) cites the Yerushalmi which answers the ‎question by saying that one says a brachah acharonah on a ‎berya – full unit, even if it is less than k’zayis. ‎

The Rishonim differ on whether we accept the Yerushalmi, and ‎what exactly the definition of a berya is. ‎

The Rambam and Rif do not cite the Yerushalmi, indicating that ‎they felt that the Yerushalmi is disputing the Bavli, and we ‎therefore do not accept it. ‎

The Rosh and Rabbenu Yonah suggest that the Yerushalmi was ‎commenting on a different story, and we may therefore also ‎rule like the Yerushalmi. ‎

The Shulchan Aruch (210:1) cites these Rishonim, and therefore ‎advises that one should not eat a full berya if not eating a full ‎k’zayis measure. ‎

Brachos Daf 36

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Halachic Issues Concerning Wheat Products Consisting of Gluten or Starch

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The advance of science has carried in its wings a number of complex halachic issues which have called the attention of contemporary poskim. One such issue is the process in which wheat is divided into its component parts of gluten and starch.

Products of the five species of grain (wheat, barley, oats, spelt and rye) normally require the berachah of hamotzi or mezonos before their consumption, and Birkas HaMazon or al ha-michyah afterwards. These grains are also unique in that they require the separation of challah, and that they can be used for baking matzos, as only these grains can become chametz. However, when flour is divided into its components of starch and gluten, the following question arises: When isolated, do these components retain the unique qualities of the five grains?

Starch and gluten: Wheat flour is made up of starch, and protein known as gluten. The starch is what causes the dough to rise and ferment, whereas the gluten is the actual substance that rises and ferments. That is to say, the starch ferments the gluten. When these two components are divided, fermentation is impossible.

Today, both substances are commonly used in the food industry. Gluten is often used in making food products such as soy hot dogs. Starch is used as a staple food product for a significant number of people who suffer from celiac, a digestive disorder that causes intolerance to gluten.

The Gemara lists the ability to ferment and rise (thus becoming chametz) as one of the unique properties that distinguish the five species of grain (Pesachim 35a; Yerushalmi, Challah 1:1). As we mentioned above, when the starch and gluten are separated, neither can rise. Therefore, perhaps they lose their status as members of the five species in regard to the required berachos. On the other hand, their ability to rise has not been entirely eliminated. If they were to be mixed together, they could rise. Therefore, perhaps they should still be considered members of the five species.

The berachah recited over soy hot dogs: In regard to soy hot dogs, which contain gluten but not starch, many contemporary poskim have ruled that the berachah shehakol should be recited. The poskim note that the berachah of mezonos is appropriate for the satiating property of these foods. Gluten alone without starch is not so satisfying, and therefore shehakol is recited. (VeZos HaBerachah, birurei halachah 24:2)

However, in regard to foods containing wheat-starch without gluten, the poskim rule that mezonos should be recited. Although we might not consider gluten-free starch in the category of the five grains (since it does not rise), it is no less satiating than rice, which also merits the berachah of mezonos although it doesn’t rise. It is still questionable whether al ha-michya should be recited afterwards, as is done after eating food from the five grains, or borei nefashos, the berachah one recites after eating rice.

Matzah made without gluten: Based on the above discussion, we can understand the serious concern that arises in regard to matzos that are made without gluten, for those who suffer from celiac. Though made from wheat flour, the starch cannot rise to become chametz. The Gemara states (Pesachim 35a) that only those grains that can become chametz can be used in baking matzos for the Seder night. It is certainly preferable to eat matzos made from natural flour on the Seder night. If for health reasons this is impossible, and the only alternative available is to eat matzos without gluten, the berachah of al achilas matzah should not be recited. Rather, someone else who is eating whole flour matzah should recite the berachah, and the person eating gluten-free matzah should answer Amen. (Rav Tzvi Weber, in the name of Rav Elyashiv shlita)

In a conversation with us Rav Weber shlita pointed out that the above discussion applies to foods that are entirely free of gluten. However, nutrition experts claim that it is generally impossible to completely separate gluten from starch. Breads, cakes and matzos that are sold as gluten-free are usually just gluten-reduced. Therefore, the appropriate berachos for flour products can be recited over them, and the matzos can be used for the Seder night with the berachah of al achilas matzah.

Blessings on Pits

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

Tosafos proves from the fact that the Gemora considers pits to be included in the prohibition of orlah that they are considered part of the fruit. Therefore if one eats eatable pits, the brachah is Borei peri ha’eitz.

However, the Rashba disagrees and says that just as we include the shell for orlah based on the extra word “es piryo,” to include even the protector of the fruit, we include pits for orlah from the same source, but they are not actually part of the fruit and therefore the brachah is Borei peri ha’adamah.

Although the Shulchan Aruch 202:3 rules like Tosafos (and the Rosh), the Tzlach says that he thinks that the halachah should be like the Rashba to recite ha’adamah on fruit pits.

He proves this from a Mishna in Orlah 1:8 that says that although they are included in orlah, they are exempt from revai (the fourth year). This would only make sense if they are not really part of the fruit, but if they would be part of the fruit they should be included in revai as well.

Although the Tzlach himself rules in accordance with the Rashba, he offers an answer for Tosafos. He suggests that there is the outer shell over the edible part of the pit which is exempt from revai, but the inner eatable pit is part of the fruit and ha’eitz.

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

No one but Hashem

The Gemora lists various explanations for the verse that refers to the reward which is unseen by anyone but Hashem. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that this unseen reward is wine that has been aged since creation. The Maharsha explains that creation was ex nihilo – something from nothing, which is above the perception of anything in the world but Hashem. Since it was from creation, it preceded Adam before the sin, while he was still in Gan Eden, and could not even be perceived by him.

The Sefer Ikarim says that the comparison to wine is due to its relation to grapes. Someone who has never experienced wine cannot imagine that the grapes can produce something that is even more enjoyable. Similarly, one who exists in the physical world cannot perceive how physical acts of mitzvos can lead to a higher level of enjoyment in the spiritual realm.

DAILY MASHAL

Gan and Eden

By: Rabbi Binyomin Adler

The verse says that no one but Hashem ever saw the ultimate reward. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba quotes Rabbi Yochanan, who explained this verse refers to three limitations on the prophecies recorded by the prophets:

1. The prophets only referred to the Messianic era, but the world to come has never been perceived. The Gemora notes that this differs with Shmuel, who says that the Messianic era will be the same natural order, but with the Jews not subjugated by the nations.

2. The prophets only referred to repentant sinners, but the righteous who never sinned will receive a reward only perceived by Hashem. The Gemora notes that this differs with Rabbi Avahu, who says that repentant sinners are superior to righteous who never sinned.

3. The prophets referred to one who has favorable interactions with Torah scholars, e.g., marrying off a daughter to one, and giving them business. However, only Hashem perceives the reward awaiting Torah scholars themselves.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that this reward that only Hashem perceives is wine aged since creation, while Raish Lakish explains it is the Eden region, as Adam only lived in its garden, but not the region itself.

It is interesting to note that the Gemora distinguishes between Eden and the Garden. We are apt to refer to the location of eternal reward as Gan Eden, the Garden of Eden. Is this a misnomer, or is there a deeper understanding concerning these distinct terminologies?

There is a kabalistic statement^[1] that the word oneg^[2], which means delight, is an acrostic for the words Eden, Nahar, and Gan. Although the explanation for this idea is beyond the scope of this exegesis, there is a fundamental concept that can be easily understood. The word Eden is defined as a form of pleasure, as it is said:^[3] after I have withered shall I again have delicate (Edna) skin? Nahar means river, and Gan means garden. What is the association between these three words? Pleasure has a source, and that is Eden, and that pleasure is continuous, like a flowing river. How does one arrive at this pleasure? We are familiar with the term Oneg Shabbos, which means delighting in the Sabbath. How does one derive pleasure from Shabbos? The Sfas Emes^[4] writes that the Gemora^[5] does not state that one who delights in the Shabbos for his personal pleasure merits all of his desires being fulfilled. Rather, it states that one who delights in the Shabbos will merit his desires being fulfilled. If one recognizes that the source of the pleasure is the Shabbos, which is the present that Hashem proffered to the Jewish People^[6], then he will be rewarded with the dividends of Shabbos.

It is important to recognize that Shabbos is not merely a day like any other day of the week. Regarding Shabbos it is said:^[7] Hashem said to Moshe saying: Now you speak to the Children of Israel, saying: ‘However, you must observe My Sabbaths, for it is a sign between Me and you for your generations, to know that I am Hashem, who makes you holy’. Rabbi Yehonasan Eibshetz^[8] writes that because Shabbos is a protection from the nations of the world, one must be well versed in the laws of Shabbos, and furthermore, that he delights in the Shabbos.

With this idea we can explain what appears to be a discrepancy in Scripture. First it is said:^[9] Hashem G-d planted a garden in Eden, to the east, and placed (vayasem) there the man whom He had formed. In the subsequent verse it is said:^[10] Hashem G-d took the man and placed him (vayanecheihu) in the Garden of Eden, to work it and to guard it. Why in the first verse does it state vayasem and in the second verse the word vayanecheihu is used? The answer is that the Medrash states^[11] that vayanecheihu is a reference to Shabbos, which is called Yom Hamenucha, a day of rest. Initially, Hashem placed Adam in the Garden without any responsibilities. This is similar to the ‘gift’ of Shabbos. Then Hashem willed that Adam appreciate the gift, and he gave him the commandment of Shabbos to fulfill. Adam was banished from Gan Eden before Shabbos. Apparently, in order for one to benefit from Shabbos, one has to understand its laws and appreciate the pleasure of this Holy Day. May we all merit the day that will be all Shabbos.

Wine

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi interpreted the verse no eye has seen to be said concerning wine preserved in its grapes since the six days of Creation. What is so significant about wine preserved in its grapes? In order to understand this cryptic statement, we must first examine the impact of wine in Judaism. The Vilna Gaon was of the opinion that one should not eat grapes on Rosh Hashanah^[12]. The reason for this is based on kabalistic teachings, but perhaps there is a simple understanding to this also. The Medrash^[13] states that according to one opinion, Chava squeezed grapes and gave the juice to Adam to drink. This was the sin of eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad. Adam and Chava were created on Rosh Hashanah,^[14] so it would follow that we should not eat grapes on that day as that would serve as a reminder of their sin. The difficulty with this explanation is that we drink wine on Rosh Hashanah, and from the Medrash it is clear that Chava gave Adam the juice from the grapes and not the grapes themselves.

Wine that is preserved in its grapes is a metaphor for modesty. After the flood, it is said:^[15] Noach, the man of the earth, debased himself and planted a vineyard. He drank of the wine and became drunk, and he uncovered himself within his tent. Rashi writes: it [his tent] is written oholo, and this alludes to the Ten Tribes who were called on the name of Shomron that is referred to as Oholo. The Ten Tribes were exiled because of wine, as it is said:^[16] who drink wine out of bowls…. [anoint themselves with choicest oils, and are not pained by the destruction of Yosef. Therefore, they will now be exiled at the heads of the exiles, and the banquets of the haughty will cease]. The Maharal^[17] is bothered that the Medrash,^[18] which appears to be the source of Rashi’s words, does not use the word oholo to derive this teaching. The Medrash states that the Torah does not state vayigal, which would imply that Noach alone was affected by his nakedness. Rather, it states vayisgal, which implies that his nakedness affected his whole tent, i.e. all future generations^[19].

Perhaps we can suggest an answer to the Maharal’s question. Rashi specifically derived this exegesis from the word oholo, because there were two aspects to Noach’s disgrace. One element was that he was uncovered, and the second was that he was uncovered in his tent. The word ohel in Tanach refers to modesty^[20]. By intoxicating himself with wine, Noach left the arena of modesty. This behavior was a sign that his descendants would also forsake the modest lifestyle and be exiled. We are accustomed to viewing modesty in areas of dress and behavior. There is another modesty, and that is the inner modesty of a person, as it is said:^[21] when a willful sinner comes, shame comes, but with modest ones comes wisdom. This modesty is symbolized by wine that is preserved in its grapes. When the Medrash states that Chava squeezed grapes and gave Adam the juice to drink, this means that she was shedding the modesty of wisdom that had been granted to them by Hashem. It is said:^[22] and the woman perceived that the tree was good for eating and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a means to wisdom, and she took of its fruit and ate; and she gave also to her husband with her and he ate. Then the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked; and they sewed together a fig leaf and made themselves aprons. It is fascinating that upon eating from the fruit of the tree, it states that their eyes were opened (vatipukachna). This is similar to what the Gemora^[23] states: wine and scents enlighten (pikchin). In this case, the wine opened their eyes and they realized that they had shed the cloak of inner modesty. The Gemora states^[24] enter wine, exit secret. This statement has many ramifications, but in the simple sense it can be understood to mean that by imbibing wine, the secret of creation departs.

Now we can begin to comprehend the statement of the Gemora: What is that which no eye has seen? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: This is wine preserved in its grapes since the six days of Creation. The wisdom of creation will only be revealed in the World to Come. The experience of Adam and Chava in Gan Eden was akin to the World to Come, as the Gemora states further: Rish Lakish says: This is Eden, which no eye has ever seen. The Arizal^[25] writes that had Adam waited until Shabbos to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad, he never would have been exiled from Gan Eden. The lack of inner modesty, i.e. concealing the wisdom that Hashem had bestowed upon them, was what catalyzed their exile. Similarly, the lack of modesty displayed by Noach affected the future generations, and they went into exile.

When we recite Kiddush on Friday night, it is important to have in mind that we are sanctifying the Shabbos through wine, and this will lead to the rectification of Adam and Chava’s sin and the ultimate redemption speedily in our days.

Please, Please

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Chida writes: “I have heard in the name of previous great teachers z”l that Moshe was given this secret in Heaven, that when he would pray and say na - ‘please’ twice, his prayer would be accepted and therefore he prayed, ‘Please, Hashem, please heal her.’ But when he prayed to enter Eretz Israel and said, ‘Please let me cross over and see…’, Hashem told him, ‘Don’t continue to speak to me about this matter (lit. with this word)’ – especially ‘with this word’, that he shouldn’t mention ‘please’ again” (Nachal Kedumim, Beha’alosecha).

The Name Is Still Hinted

When praying for one’s fellow one doesn’t need to mention his name as is written “Please G-d, please heal her” without mentioning Miriam’s name.

Still, her name and mother’s name are hinted: the numerical equivalent of refa na (“please heal”) is that of Miryam Yocheved! (Degel Machaneh Efrayim, Beha’alosecha).

A Kabbalist Or Not

A person who pretended to be a Kabbalist came to Rabbi Aizel Charif zt”l and requested an approbation for his book. Even after much pleading, Rabbi Aizel refused. People asked him why and he replied, “Last night I saw him as a shliach tzibur and becoming confused in his prayer as though he didn’t know the meaning of the words and Chazal said, ‘If my prayer is fluent, I know that he is mekubal (“accepted” or “a Kabbalist”) and if not…’.”

Brachos 26

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HALACHAH FROM THE DAF

The final time for kerias shema’ according to Magen Avraham and the Vilna Gaon

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Every self-respecting publisher of a calendar takes care to indicate every day the end of the time for kerias shema’ according to Magen Avraham and the Vilna Gaon. Why did these two times come about? This article will discuss the issue and reveal that this is already an ancient difference of opinions among the Rishonim.

Chazal determined many time-limits for beginning and ending the observance of mitzvos. We learnt, for example, in the mishnah: “From when do we say the shema’ in the morning?…Till the third hour.” Concerning chametz on the eve of Pesach, Chazal said, “We eat it during the first four hours and may derive benefit from it during the fifth hour and burn it at the start of the sixth hour.”

Everyone knows that Chazal measured the day and night according to relative hours (sha’os zemaniyos) and not according to 60-minute hours like ours. In other words, today the time indicates a fixed and measured period of time. A sha’ah zemanis is determined by dividing the daytime into 12 equal parts while each part is called an hour. The night was also divided into 12 parts and each part was called an hour of the night. It is self-understood that a sha’ah zemanis in the summer is longer than a sha’ah zemanis in the winter as both days are divided into 12 parts while a summer day is long and a winter day is short (see this whole topic in Rambam’s commentary on the Mishnah here).

We have yet to clarify one thing, which is actually the heart of the tremendous difference of opinions: What day did Chazal divide into 12 parts? There are two possibilities. It could be that Chazal took the duration between sunrise and sunset and called it day. It’s also possible that the day they measured and divided into 12 parts is much longer, lasting from ‘alos hashachar, dawn – much before sunrise – till the appearance of the stars, much after sunset.

Now let’s make a simple calculation. Let’s assume that ‘alos hashachar is at 4:30, sunrise at 6:00, sunset at 6:00 in the evening and the appearance of the stars at 7:30. If we take the day and divide the time between sunrise and sunset, then the three hours for kerias shema’ end at 9:00 in the morning. However, if we divide the daytime between ‘alos hashachar and the appearance of the stars, then a sha’ah zemanis of this day amounts to an hour and a quarter on our clock. Then the final time for kerias shema, 3¾ hours after dawn, is at 8:15! If we examine the Rishonim on our sugya, we notice that they disagreed about this issue.

The mishnah says that according to the Chachamim, the time for minchah is till the evening and according to Rabbi Yehudah, till plag haminchah. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehudah means till “11 hours less a quarter” – i.e., an hour and a quarter before evening. According to Rashi (26a, s.v. ‘Ad ha’erev), Ramban (Toras HaAdam, Sha’ar Aveilus Yeshanah) and the Rashba (2a), the evening starts at the appearance of the stars and plag haminchah virtually coincides (within about 3 minutes) with sunset. However, Rabbi Sa’adyah Gaon (Sidur Rasag, p. 26), Rav Hai Gaon (in the Mordechai, Ch. 4, §90), Rambam (Hilchos Tefillah 3:4) and Rabeinu Yonah (at the beginning of Tefillas HaShachar) maintain that the time called “evening” starts at sunset and Rabbi Yehudah’s plag haminchah is an hour and a quarter before that. We thus have a difference of opinions among the Rishonim as to if the day divided by the Chachamim into hours ends at sunset or with the appearance of the stars. As for the halachah, Terumas HaDeshen, the Levush and others disagreed about this question (see Magen Avraham, 233, S.K. 3, and 443, S.K. 3).

It only remains for us to understand how Magen Avraham and the Vilna Gaon became involved in this difference of opinions such that it is named for them. Magen Avraham innovates (see 58, S.K. 1) that there’s no difference of opinions regarding the time for kerias shema’. In his opinion, even those who maintain that the day meant by the Chachamim starts at sunrise admit that concerning kerias shema’, Chazal meant to count the hours starting with ‘alos hashachar. He thus significantly shortens the final time for kerias shema’. The Vilna Gaon disgreed and claimed (Beiur HaGra, ibid, and see Chazon Ish, O.C. 13) that his chidush is incorrect but those who hold that Chazal’s day starts at sunrise maintain the same also regarding kerias shema’. Since then, the two opinions have been called “Magen Avraham’s time” and “the Vilna Gaon’s time”. Once the Vilna Gaon decided that the matter remains a disagreement among the Rishonim, he ruled the halachah according to those who hold that Chazal counted the hours from sunrise to sunset (and so holds the author of Tanya and see ‘Aroch HaShulchan, 58; Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., I, 24, and III, 129; we should mention that the Magen Avraham’s time appearing in most calendars assumes that ‘alos hashachar is 90 minutes before sunrise and so is the duration between sunset and the appearance of the stars; however, according to the ruling of many poskim [see Shulchan ‘Aruch, O.C. 459:2; the Remo, 261:1; Mishnah Berurah, 235, S.K. 4; etc.], ‘alos hashachar is 72 minutes before sunrise; if so, Magen Avraham’s time is later: the difference is about ten minutes; we should mention that several geonim of our era point out, and HaGaon Rav A. Kotler zt”l already remarked, that Magen Avraham’s time is relevant if we assume that the appearance of the stars is according to Rabeinu Tam’s opinion that there are two sunsets, but according to the Geonim, this calculation is not relevant at all. This is not the place to expand any more).

When Sunday comes before motzaei Shabbos

Aside from the three regular prayers every day – shacharis, minchah and ma’ariv – there’s another prayer, tefillas tashlumin, which makes up for a missed prayer. A person who missed minchah should pray Shemoneh ‘Esreh twice at ma’ariv, once for ma’ariv and once for minchah. Our Gemara emphasizes that it should be in this order, first ma’ariv and then minchah, as he must first pray the regular prayer, whose time is now, and then tefillas tashlumin. If he had the opposite intention, he didn’t fulfill his obligation!

Atah chonantanu in shacharis: Once a person forgot to pray ma’ariv on motzaei Shabbos. At shacharis he asked HaGaon Rabbi Chayim of Brisk zt”l when he should say Atah chonantanu – during the first Shemoneh ‘Esreh or the second. Rabbi Chayim was occupied in his prayer and a Rabbi standing nearby replied that he should mention Atah chonantanu in the tefillas tashlumin, which stands in for last night’s ma’ariv. Rabbi Chayim, who heard this, hinted to the person to wait a while and when he finished his prayer, ruled the opposite: “Say Atah chonantanu in the Shemoneh ‘Esreh of shacharis”! Those present wondered greatly and Rabbi Chayim explained. Atah chonantanu is not especially relevant to Shemoneh ‘Esreh of motzaei Shabbos but must be said in the first prayer after Shabbos. Usually, this prayer is ma’ariv on motzaei Shabbos but what should we do for this unfortunate person whose first prayer after Shabbos is shacharis? (Ishim Veshitos, 61).

At any rate, that Rav didn’t err. Another Rav held likewise, as earlier geonim already disagreed about the issue. HaGaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger zt”l (in Gilyon HaShulchan ‘Aruch, 294) ruled that Atah chonantanu must be said in the first prayer after Shabbos and Pri Megadim (ibid) and Tosefes Shabbos (ibid) maintained that Atah chonantanu should be said in the tefillas tashlumin for ma’ariv.

As for the halachah, the Chafetz Chayim zt”l ruled (Mishnah Berurah, 294, S.K. 2, and in Beiur Halachah, s.v. Omerim) that if he made (or heard) havdalah on wine, Atah chonantanu should not be said, neither in shacharis nor in tefillas tashlumin, but if someone didn’t make havdalah on wine and therefore must say Atah chonantanu, he should say it in the tefillas tashlumin for ma’ariv and not in the first Shemoneh ‘Esreh of shacharis. The reason is that as on motzaei Shabbos one must pronounce havdalah on wine and also say Atah chonantanu, Chazal matched the prayer of havdalah said in Shemoneh ‘Esreh to the havdalah said on the wine. That is, the havdalah in prayer was instituted to be said especially in ma’ariv of motzaei Shabbos and therefore, if someone forgot to pray, he should say Atah chonantanu in the tefillas tashlumin of ma’ariv, where Atah chonantanu was instituted (see ibid his proof for this ruling and why he rules so only if he didn’t make havdalah yet).

We conclude with an easy pilpul. Our Gemara says that if a person forgot to pray minchah on Shabbos, he should pray Shemoneh ‘esreh twice on motzaei Shabbos and say Atah chonantanu in the first Shemoneh ‘Esreh because it is ma’ariv. Apparently, why did the Gemara trouble to say this? If the first Shemoneh ‘Esreh were the tefillas tashlumin for minchah, would one not have to say Atah chonantanu therein? After all, Rabbi Chayim contends that Atah chonantanu should be said in the first weekday prayer! Is this not solid proof for the Rav who disagreed with Rabbi Chayim?

Rabbi Chayim’s grandson, HaGaon Rav M.D. Soloveitchik, thinks not. In his opinion, even Rabbi Chayim would admit that it’s impossible to say Atah chonantanu, which distinguishes between a holy and a mundane day, in a prayer whose obligation stems from Shabbos. Rabbi Chayim did not consider such a thing. He only meant that Atah chonantanu may be moved between two weekday prayers whose order has been reversed but not from a weekday prayer to a prayer stemming from Shabbos (Asufos Rabeinu Chayim HaLevi, here, in the name of Binyan Mordechai, beginning of Berachos).

Brachos Daf 25

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HALACHAH FROM THE DAF

Through a Window or with Glasses

The Rashb”a proves from our Gemora that seeing something through glass is regarded halachicaly as “seeing.” Therefore he rules that if one sees the fire from the havdalah candle through a glass, he has discharged his obligation.

The Magen Avraham rules like this as well, and he explains one stringent ruling of the Shulchan Aruch to be referring to a case where the candle was encased in a metal container with holes in it; however, if it would be made completely out of glass, there would be no concern.

The Bi’ur Halachah disagrees and states that although seeing through glass is regarded halachicaly as “seeing,” nevertheless, regarding the brachah of borei me’orei ha’eish, seeing through glass will not be sufficient. He explains that the brachah was instituted on fire that is exposed without any covering – similar to the way it was at the time that it was created.

The Ketzos Hashulchan rules that even according to the Bi’ur Halachah, one who wears glasses, has fulfilled his obligation by seeing the candle, and he is not required to remove them and see the fire with his eyes. This is because the purpose of glasses are to enable a person to see better.

The Hilchos Ketanos rules, based upon our Gemora, that one who reads from a Sefer Torah with glasses, has fulfilled his obligation. He adds that so it would be if one sees an elder passing by through a window, he is obligated to stand up out of respect for him.

The Dvar Shmuel writes that one who sees the moon through a glass – it is not regarded as “seeing.” Nevertheless, he is permitted to recite the blessing because other people see it – similar to the halachah which applies to a blind person.

DAILY MASHAL

Knowing the Torah Like the Angels

One must always be exceedingly vigilant to avoid embarrassing any human being. Chazal compare doing so to murder, and they prescribed that one cast himself into a fiery furnace rather than fall into this prohibition. Although some Rishomin write that this is merely a middas chassidus, Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurebach, zt”l, rules like most Rishonim who take this at face value.

This is one reason why Rav Fischer, zt”l, refused to test children while their teachers were present. Not only that, but he would test each student separately, lest one who was less prepared be shamed in front of his friends. When the melamed would naturally ask after their performance, Dayan Fischer would invariably reply, “They knew the material.” He would immediately add, “Some knew more and some less, but they all knew…”

A certain father was very proud of his unmarried son who was studying for the first chelek of Yoreh Deiah in the hopes of becoming a rav. When the young man finished the first one hundred and eleven simanim—the customary test for a rav in those days—his father took him to the famous Rav Aizel of Slonim , zt”l, to be tested for semichah. However, although the young man had covered all of the material, his method had hardly been thorough. Sadly, his “good answers” proved that he was not nearly ready for the rigorous test which was the only way to obtain semichah from Rav Aizel.

The test had not been given in a public place, but there were several scholars waiting to speak with Rav Aizel there who witnessed the young man’s performance. They wondered how Rav Aizel would manage to reject him without shaming him or his father. But they could never have guessed what the Rav’s response would actually be. He turned to the father and said, “Although I cannot give your son semichah now, you should know that he is a malach, an angel.” The father was thrilled with this approbation, and floated from the room.

Afterward, one puzzled scholar asked Rav Aizel, “Whatever did you mean? The boy is clearly an am ha’aretz!” Rav Aizel replied with a twinkle in his eye, “Does it not say in Brachos 25b that the Torah was not given to the ministering angels?”

Cited in Daf Digest and in Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Brachos Daf 22

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Hybrids

The Gemora cites Rabbi Yoshia’s opinion, that one is only liable for kil’ai hakerem – a hybrid vineyard if he sows a grape seed and two grain seeds simultaneously.

Although we rule like Rabbi Yoshia, the Rishonim differ on the parameters of his position.

Rashi implies that Rabbi Yoshia says that any prohibition of hybrid only applies when one plants three species together.

Tosfos (54a dagan) says that Rabbi Yoshia indeed says there is no Torah prohibition of a hybrid vineyard except in the case of simultaneously sowing the three species. However, he does agree that sowing the two non-grape species together is a prohibition of kil’ai zra’im – hybrid sowing. If one planted these two seeds together with a grape seed, he actually simultaneously violates two prohibitions – kil’ai zra’im and kil’ai hakerem.

The Rambam rules that although only violates the prohibition of kil’ai hakerem by sowing three seeds simultaneously, if one planted a grain or vegetation in an existing vineyard, the resulting crop is prohibited from eating and benefit.

The Ra’avad says that Rabbi Yoshia’s statement is limited to one being liable for lashes, but Rabbi Yoshia agrees that one may not plant even one seed together with a grapeseed.

Some say (see Lechem Mishneh Ma’achalos Asuros 10:6) that the Rambam says that it is prohibited from the Torah to plant one seed with a grapeseed.

Based on these different positions, the Rishonim would read the Gemora’s question slightly differently. The Gemora had said that the logical argument to require terumah for each species was due to the fact that the different species were prohibited to be planted together. The Gemora challenged this argument according to Rabbi Yoshia’s position, as mixing grains or a grain with a grape would be permitted. According to Rashi, the Gemora’s question is to be read exactly as stated, as Rabbi Yoshia would permit both types of mixtures on their own. According to Tosfos, the Gemora’s question is actually only from the case of mixing a grain with a grape, but not from the case of mixing grains, as Rabbi Yoshia agrees that mixing grains is prohibited as kil’ai zera’im. According to Ra’avad (and perhaps the Rambam), the Gemora’s question is actually only from the case of mixing grains, which Rabbi Yoshia would permit, but not from the case of mixing a grain with grape, as he agrees that that is prohibited, albeit not punished with lashes.

HALACHOS FROM THE DAF

Immersion of a Ba’al Keri

The Gemora cites a braisa: It is written [Devarim 4:9]: Make them known to your children and your children’s children and the next verse states: The day that you stood before Hashem, your G-d in Choreb. We derive from the juxtaposition of the two verses that just as when the Jews stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah, they did so in dread and awe, with trembling and fear, so too, when Torah is being studied in all future generations, it must be learned with dread and awe, with trembling and fear. They said: One who is a zav, metzora or one who had relations with a niddah is permitted to read the Torah, Prophets and Writings, and he can study the Medrash, Talmud, Halacha and any Aggadic teachings. It is learned from here that a baal keri, one who experienced a seminal emission, is prohibited from reading the Torah, Prophets and Writings, nor can he study the Medrash, Talmud, Halacha and any Aggadic teachings. This is because the baal keri developed a tumah which occurred through levity and this is in contrast to the feelings of awe which are required when studying Torah.

The Gemora in Brochos (22a) states that one who is a baal keri should immerse himself in a ritual bath before studying Torah or praying. This is known as Tevilas Ezra.

The Gemora (ibid) states that nowadays Tevilas Ezra has been nullified. The Rif explains: Some say that it was nullified completely and a baal keri is not required to immerse himself in a mikvah prior to studying Torah or praying and others say that it was limited to studying Torah, but one would still be required to immerse himself in a mikvah prior to praying. He concludes: It is not required to immerse in a mikvah; nine kavin of water poured on his body will be sufficient.

Rabbeinu Hai Gaon states: Since it is not explicit in the Gemora, a baal keri must follow the custom of all the Jewish people and he should not commence to pray until he washes himself.

The Raavad in Sefer Haeshkol asked Rabbeinu Hai Gaon as to what should be done if one becomes a baal keri on Shabbos or on a festival when he cannot immerse himself in a mikvah. He responded that he remembers many Shabbosos being by Rav Aharon Gaon when they prayed in his house and Rav Aharon Gaon would not pray at all.

The Rambam (Hilchos Krias Shema) writes that Ezra’s enactment did not spread throughout Klal Yisroel and a majority of the community was not able to maintain it, therefore it became nullified. It has become the custom throughout Klal Yisroel to study Torah and recite Kerias Shema even while they are a baal keri since Torah is not susceptible to becoming tamei.

The Rambam in Hilchos Tefillah (4:4) writes that Ezra instituted that a baal keri should not study Torah until he immerses himself in a mikvah and a later Beis Din extended this decree to include tefillah. This was not on the account of tumah, but rather because they did not want the Talmudic scholars to be constantly with their wives like roosters. The decree regarding tefillah became nullified because the original enactment did not catch on throughout Klal Yisroel and a majority of the community was not able to maintain it. It has become the custom in certain areas for a baal keri not to pray until he washes his entire body with water based on the verse: One should prepare himself before greeting Hashem, the G-d of Israel.

The sefer Brocha Mishuleshes writes that it only became nullified in instances where one cannot locate a water source, however where water is accessible, a baal keri should not study Torah or pray until he washes himself. He concludes that one Beis Din does not have the power to nullify the decrees of a previous Beis Din.

It is written in Shailos V’teshuvos min Hashamayim (5): It is this fact (the people who are a baal keri and pray without immersing themselves) that has caused the exile to be so long. If Klal Yisroel’s tefillah would be in the proper way, our prayers would have been accepted years before.

He concludes: Perhaps we cannot accomplish that every baal keri should immerse himself in a mikvah prior to his tefillah, but at least the chazzan (leader of the services) should immerse himself and it will be in this merit that will hasten the Redemption.

Shulchan Aruch (O”C 88) rules that Ezra’s decree has been nullified and a baal keri can pray and study Torah without immersing himself. The Magen Avraham writes: Even though that one Beis Din does not have the power to nullify the decrees of a previous Beis Din unless they are greater in wisdom or numbers, since this enactment never caught on throughout Klal Yisroel, it can become nullified.

The Mishnah Berurah writes that one who has the custom to purify himself through immersion should only do so if he will not neglect the correct time to recite kerias shema and tefillah He adds that possibly, if immersing in the mikvah will result that he will not be able to pray along with a minyan, it is preferable not to go to the mikvah.

It is written in the sefer Meor V’shemesh: It is impossible to comprehend the true meaning of fearing Hashem if one is not careful in regards to this immersion. If one studies Kabbalah without purifying himself, the learning will result in heresy. He cites from the Baal Shem Tov and the Rebbe Reb Elimelech that one who wishes to comprehend Torah and mitzvos must be careful in this immersion, otherwise they will not be capable of reaching the heights they wish to attain.

Brachos 21

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INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The Land Became Lost

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The Chanukas HaTorah explains: The Gemora asks: From where do we derive that one should recite a blessing prior to studying Torah? Rabbi Yishmael says: It is derived by means of a kal vachomer. If a blessing is recited before partaking in “sustenance for the moment” (food), it certainly follows that a blessing should be recited on “eternal sustenance”! The Gemora (Brochos 38a) also states: Prior to reciting a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem; after the blessing is recited, the land is given over to man.

Accordingly, it can be said that if they refrained from reciting a blessing before studying Torah, it is clearly evident that they did not recite a blessing before eating as well. For if they would have made a blessing before the consumption of food, they certainly would have made a blessing before studying Torah (based upon the kal vachomer). Since they didn’t recite a blessing on their food, the land became lost, for prior to a blessing, the land belongs to Hashem.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Birchas HaTorah

Rabbi Yehuda Balsam

The Gemora in Nedarim (81a) records that Hashem told the Jewish people that Eretz Yisroel was lost due to the fact that the Jews did not say Birchas HaTorah.

The Ran (s.v. davar zeh) cites Rabbeinu Yonah who explains that the Gemora is telling us that although the Jewish people were learning Torah, they didn’t consider it worthy of meriting its own Birchas HaMitzvah. Rather, they viewed it as any other subject that was to be studied in order to increase one’s knowledge, but not something that carried an inherent spiritual value. Therefore, their Torah study did not achieve for them what it should have, and as a result, the Jews were left spiritually barren.

From this Gemora, we see the value of saying Birchas HaTorah as an enhancement of our Limud HaTorah. But what about the mitzvah itself?

Our Gemora asks: How do I know that Birchas HaTorah is Biblical? Because the verse says: When I call in the name of Hashem, I must give praise to our master. The Gemora continues and attempts to prove that brachah rishonah is Biblical as well using Birchas HaTorah as a source of a Kal Vachomer. It seems clear from this Gemora that Birchas HaTorah is a Biblical mitzvah.

This is the opinion of the Rashba, and the sefer Hachinuch. However, the Rambam leaves this mitzvah out of his Minyan Hamitzvos, and the Ramban takes him to task for this. He writes (paraphrased): The fifteenth mitzvah (that the Rambam neglected) is that we are commanded to thank Hashem any time that we read from the Torah for the great gift that he has given us… Just as we are commanded to bless Hashem after we eat, so too we are commanded in this. The Ramban continues and says that there is no way that the Gemora would have tried to prove that brachah rishonah is Biblical using Birchas HaTorah if it had not assumed that Birchas HaTorah itself is Biblical. He then explains that one should not assume that Birchas HaTorah should be included in the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, (thereby disproving the notion that perhaps the Rambam agrees that Birchas HaTorah is Biblical, and his oversight of its inclusion in his Minyan Hamitzvos is due to the fact that it is included elsewhere) just as we do not include the recital of bikkurim in the overall mitzvah of bringing the bikkurim, nor do we include the mitzvah of relating about the Exodus from Egypt in the mitzvah of eating Korban Pesach.

Thus, we see that the Majority of Rishonim claim that Birchas HaTorah is Biblical, and the Rambam assumes that it is only Rabbinic in origin. (

However, the Aruch Hashulchan (siman 47, sif 2) claims that even the Rambam agrees that Birchas HaTorah is Biblical, and he includes it in the mitzvah of Talmud Torah.

Concerning the Ramban’s disproof to this explanation, he explains that recital of bikkurim and the mitzvah of relating about the Exodus from Egypt are both mitzvos that are done at separate times from their general categories, whereas Birchas HaTorah is said immediately preceding the act of learning, and is the same action.

Whether we accept the Aruch Hashulchan’s understanding of the Rambam or not, it is clear that the consensus opinion is that Birchas HaTorah is a mitzvah min HaTorah.

The most obvious practical difference in any clarification of a mitzvah’s biblical status is what to do in a case of doubt. Generally, if one is unsure if he recited any brachah (except Birchas HaMazon) we say that he need not repeat it because of safek brachos l’hakel. However, this is generally assumed to be based on the rule of sfeikah d’rabanan l’kulah. Therefore, by Birchas HaTorah, this would seemingly not apply, and one would be required to repeat Birchas HaTorah in a case where he was in doubt as to whether he has already said it. Indeed this is the opinion of both the Aruch Hashulchan (sif 6) and the Mishnah Berurah (s.k.1). They recommend (based on the aforementioned Sha’agas Aryeh) that one should only recite the brachah of Asher Bachar Banu, because that itself is enough to satisfy the Biblical requirement. The Mishnah Berurah further recommends, that due to those whose opinion is that one should not repeat Birchas HaTorah in a case of doubt, one should ideally try to hear the brachos from someone else and discharge his obligation through, him, or to have in mind during Ahavah Rabbah that he wishes to fulfill his obligation of Birchas HaTorah and to learn immediately after Davening.

DAILY MASHAL

They didn’t Recite the Blessing on the Torah “First”

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What does the verse mean when it says: Who is the man who is wise and can understand this? This (the reason for the destruction of the Second Temple) was asked to scholars and prophets and they could not explain it, until Hashem explained it Himself, as it says: And Hashem said that it is because they left my Torah. Isn’t the phrase “and they did not listen to My voice” the same as the phrase “and they did not go in its ways”? Rav Yehudah explains in the name of Rav: This means that they did not recite a blessing before learning Torah.

The language of the Gemora is that they didn’t recite a blessing on the Torah “techilah.” What is that word coming to exclude? We do not recite any blessings after we conclude learning Torah! (The Levush says that the two blessings that we recite before studying Torah are actually “one before” and “one after,” except that we never finish studying Torah, so the Rabbis instituted that both blessings should be recited beforehand.)

The Orach Yesharim explains: When a person receives a present, he values both the gift and the giver. Even if the gift is a small one, he will value it, if it was given to him by a prominent person. Similarly, he will appreciate something given to him by an ordinary person, if the item is a valuable one.

The Torah is praised with both elements. It is written: Ki lekech tov nasati lachem, the Torah itself is valuable, and that it is being gifted to Klal Yisroel from Hashem.

This could be the explanation as to why we recite two blessings before studying Torah. The first brachah is asher bachar banu, Hashem chose us; Torah is special because Hashem has given it to us. The second brachah is v’chayei olam nata b’socheinu, Torah is precious because of its inherent value.

This is the meaning of the Gemora: They appreciated the value of Torah, and therefore, they recited the second blessing. However, they were not fully appreciative of the Giver of the Torah, and they therefore refrained from reciting the first blessing on the Torah. This is why the Torah did not continue to flourish with their children.

Birchas Hamazon and Birchas HaTorah

Orchos Chaim

The Gemora teaches us of the Torah’s commandment to bless Hashem after we eat a meal - Birchas Hamazon. “[After] you have eaten and become satisfied bless Hashem your G-d on the good land that He gave you.”

Rav Meir Simcha of Dvinsk opens our eyes to a new dimension of this fundamental mitzvah. Our Gemora attempts to prove that in addition to the grace after the meal we should also be obligated by Torah law to make a blessing before partaking of the meal. The sages apply a familiar form of logic to prove this position. It is called a kal v’chomer - a fortiori , i.e. it is logical to infer that if we have two situations, case A and case B, and we see that the Torah requires the application of a law in case A then in the event that case B is a more compelling situation, certainly the same law should also apply. In our discussion, the Talmud applies this method to the law of blessing Hashem for our food. Here is the argument: Since we know from the above mentioned verse that the Torah requires a blessing after our hunger has been satisfied it follows all the more so that we should bless Hashem before we eat, while our burning urge for food is at its peak and we are about to obtain something from Hashem’s creation in order to satisfy our acute need of food and sustenance. Simply put; the greater the need the more compelling it is to bless Hashem. Common decency would certainly dictate to ask permission before taking something, even more so than giving thanks for it after the fact. However this position is rejected by an earlier discussion. The halachic conclusion of the Gemora is that the Torah law requires only a blessing after eating whereas the blessing before eating is only of rabbinic origin.

Rav Meir Simcha explains why ultimately the Gemora does not accept this apparently logical argument. It all depends on the reason for requiring the blessing in the first place. If the purpose of the blessing is to acknowledge Hashem as the provider of our physical needs, then there is even a more compelling reason to bless Hashem before we eat since we are in a state of great need and if not for Hashem providing the food that sits in the plate in front of us we would continue to feel the distress of hunger. Before we award ourselves as recipients of His great kindness we should acknowledge it with a blessing. Rav Meir Simcha explains that if acknowledgment and gratitude were the only reason for the mitzvah of grace after the meal then it would indeed be logical to deduce from it an additional Torah binding requirement to make a blessing before we eat. But there is a more fundamental reason for the mitzvah of grace after the meal. After enjoying the physical pleasures of eating one is likely to forget Hashem and even come to rebel against His kindness. This we can see from the verses that follow the mitzvah of grace after the meal. In chapter 8 verses 11-20 Moshe warns of the character flaws that can develop as a result of indulgence in the pleasure of eating. “Be cautious that you do not forget Hashem your G-d and disobey His commandments, laws and statutes that I command you today. You will become arrogant and forget Hashem. And you will come to say that it is through my own strength and power that I produced all of this wealth” It appears that indulgence in the physical brings with it the potential to bring out the worst within us that in turn could cause great damage to our character.

The Gemora (Brachos 32) tells us that the lion does not roar on an empty stomach, only on a full one. Similarly, the evil inclination yetzer harah has a tendency to erupt after a good meal. Unlike on a fast day when we are less likely to be enticed by our primal instincts; after a good meal the yetzer harah will raise its ugly head. The pleasure of eating can lead to feelings of levity, haughtiness, arrogance, laziness and smugness. The danger of falling into this harmful mindset increases greatly after we have eaten and become satisfied, whereas an empty churning stomach will assist us in acknowledging that Hashem is the source of all that is good. It is only after our stomach is filled with His goodness that we tend to forget it. This is why the Gemora concludes that one cannot deduce the obligation to bless Hashem before we eat from the mitzvah of Birchas Hamazon after we eat. The two blessings are totally different in their core reasons. The mitzvah to bless Hashem after the meal is to remind us not to allow a false and haughty sense of satisfaction to corrupt our character. The blessing before we eat is common decency; to acknowledge the benefactor before becoming the beneficiary.

In order to help us avoid the character hazards of eating, the Torah requires us to recall that the good sensation after a hearty meal is a gift from our Creator; as it is with all of our physical pleasures and possessions; all are gifts from Hashem. To the extent that we internalize this truth we will be able to avoid haughtiness and arrogance and numerous other character flaws with which the yetzer harah attempts to blind us.

Our Gemora draws some interesting comparisons between the mitzvah of Birchas Hamazon grace after the meal and the blessing we recite over the study of Torah. The Torah requires us to make a blessing before we begin Torah study each day, whereas no blessing is required after we finish our study. This is just the opposite of the food blessings where the Torah requires us to make a blessing only after we have finished our meal, whereas the blessing before we eat is only a rabbinic requisite. Rav Meir Simcha reveals to us a unique parallelism between the two. Often, when we begin Torah study our initial intention is to gain knowledge for personal benefit or gratification. The wisdom of the Torah is so deep and intriguing that anyone who possesses it, in addition to feeling a high degree of self-satisfaction, will likely receive a lot of recognition and credit for his outstanding wisdom. If we were to continue our study of Torah for anything other than altruistic reasons we could easily fall into the trap of arrogance and make use of Torah knowledge for personal gain. This would render our Torah study to nothing more than a “spade for digging”. To use the Torah as a “spade”, as a means to manipulate others or attain admiration is a gross defilement of the Torah, to which the destruction of the land of Israel is attributed. Our sages stated this in tractate Nedarim 81 “Why was the land destroyed because they did not make a blessing before beginning their Torah study!” They did not acknowledge that Torah is a gift from Hashem in order to purify and elevate our character. Instead they used the Torah as a means of personal advancement while corrupting their character.

Before we begin the study of Torah each day it is imperative to remind ourselves that Hashem gave us the Torah to elevate and purify our souls, to become holy servants of Hashem, not to use it for egocentric gain. On the other hand after we have indulged ourselves in Torah study we need not remind ourselves of anything because through immersing ourselves in Torah study, the Torah itself will elevate us from selfish self-centeredness to sanctity and purity of deed and heart. The Torah is the dwelling place of the Shechinah and one who clings to Torah clings to Hashem. Even though before we begin our Torah study we may be tempted to approach it with selfish motivations; after we have immersed ourselves in its study it has the spiritual force to transform us and elevate us above the petty nature of man. This thought is expressed in the Midrash Rabbah Vayikra 10: “When Moshe spoke to the people he stood them all between the two staves of the Holy Ark to teach us that the souls of all of the Jewish people are rooted and united in Torah. When they stand together within the confines of the staves of Torah, Hashem rests His presence upon them.” After indulging in Torah study we are in an intimate state of closeness to Hashem and it is not necessary to remind ourselves by means of a blessing of Hashem’s presence in our life. May we all experience the advantages and pleasures of clinging to Hashem in all situations even after a great meal!

Brachos Daf 20

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HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Kiddush

The Gemora cites the statement of Rav Ada bar Ahava that from the simultaneous expression of zachor and shamor we learn that women are obligated in kiddush (from zachor) just as they are obligated in the negative commandments of Shabbos (shamor).

Rav Adda bar Ahavah says that women are obligated in kiddush d’var Torah – from the Torah, indicating that kiddush itself is a Torah obligation.

Tosfos (in Shavuos 20b) questions this from the Gemora in Nazir (4a), which says that drinking the wine of kiddush is not a Torah obligation. Tosfos offers the following answers:

1. The obligation to recite kiddush is from the Torah, but the obligation to do so on a cup of wine is Rabbinic.

2. Kiddush over wine is a Torah obligation, but the obligation to drink the wine is Rabbinic.

The Magen Avraham (O”C 271:1) therefore assumes that once one says maariv on Friday night, he has fulfilled his Torah obligation of kiddush and is left only with the Rabbinic obligation of kiddush on wine.

The later Acharonim discuss the implications of this statement at length. See Dagul Merevava, Biur Halachah, Livyas Chen on O”C 271 and Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Responsa 7) for discussions on how a man who has said maariv can release his wife from her Torah obligation. See Yabia Omer (1:15:6-15) on sources for and challenges to the Magen Avraham’s statement.

DAILY MASHAL

Living in the World to Come

Rav Avira expounded; sometimes he said it in the name of Rabbi Ami, and sometimes he said it in the name of Rabbi Assi: The ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, it is written in Your Torah: Asher lo yisa panim v’lo yikach shochad — Who does not show favor and Who does not take a bribe, but You do, in fact, show favor to the people of Israel, as it is written: Yisa Hashem panav ei’lecha — May Hashem show you favor!? Hashem replied to them: And shall I not show favor to the people of Israel, seeing that I wrote for them in the Torah: V’achalta v’savata u’veirachta es Hashem Elokecha — And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless Hashem, your God, and they are stringent upon themselves that even if the quantity is but an olive or an egg (they recite Birkas Hamazon).

HaRav Shimon Schwab asks: How did this answer the question? The verse explicitly states that Hashem will not show favor to the Jewish people!?

Furthermore, how did the Sages institute that Birkas Hamazon should be recited even after eating an amount of an olive or an egg? The Torah clearly mandates that the obligation is dependent upon satiation, and food in the quantity of an olive or an egg will not satisfy a person!? This why there is no blessing after a pleasant aroma, for it is not satiating.

He answers by citing the Toras Kohanim, which states that in the future, in the World to Come, one will eat a little and be satisfied (similar to the minchah offerings in the Temple). The Sages based their ordinance on this concept – consuming food in the amount of an olive or an egg is regarded as satisfaction – not in this world, but in the next one.

This explains why Hashem can favor the Jewish people. They have shown that they are living in this world, but it is with a constant anxiousness to be living in the World to Come, one where one can be satisfied with a mere morsel of food. When Hashem said that he will not favor the Jewish people – that was specifically a practice for this world, but not for the next one. By the Jewish people’s display of “living in the World to Come” even in this world, Hashem shows favor to them, as if they were actually living in the World to Come.

Hashem will Show you Favor

and Grant you Peace

Arvei Nachal

Chazal taught in the Gemora that the ministering angels asked Hashem that the Torah writes that Hashem “will not show favor nor will He take any bribe” (Devarim 10,17), yet He shows favor to Yisrael, as it says “Hashem will show you favor”. Hashem replied: How can I not show them favor when it says in My Torah “and you shall eat and be satisfied and bless”, but they are particular to bless even if the quantity is but the size of an olive or an egg!

Now, it is clear that one does not show favor to a person unless there is a good reason for doing so, for example, because of his righteousness or wisdom. So when it says that Hashem “will not show favor” it must be referring to Tzaddikim, since it is obvious that He will not treat the wicked favorably. If so, how does Hashem’s reply to the ministering angels that Yisrael are particular to bless even on small quantities - meaning that they are very righteous - answer their question?

But we can understand it with the explanation of the Rambam on the Mishna in the fourth perek of Pirkei Avos which says that Hashem does not show favor nor take a bribe, like the passuk that was quoted above. He explains that this means that when a person sins Hashem does not deduct from his mitzvos, but rather He punishes the person for his sin and the reward for his mitzvos remains untouched.

It seems to me that reason for this is because Chazal taught that reward is not given for the mitzvos in this world, since the reward for even one mitzvah is infinite and so cannot be contained by this finite world. But this world does suffice for finite punishment to be given here. If so, it is not possible to deduct from a person’s mitzvos because of a sin, because this would be like taking a drop from the ocean, which would leave the ocean virtually untouched. So too if the reward of a person’s mitzvos would be reduced corresponding to the amount of the sin, his reward would remain as it was without any reduction at all. However, the Marhasha wrote that when a person adds of his own volition a safeguard to a mitzvah he does receive reward for it in this world. We see from this that the power and the reward of the safeguard is not like that of the mitzvah itself, and therefore could be used as a bribe.

This is the explanation of the Gemora. Showing favor to someone means that although he does something improper, because he is righteous people are silent about it and treat him favorably. But the passuk says that Hashem “does not show favor”, and punishes the Tzaddik in this world even for a small sin. Similarly, the end of the previous passuk in this parsha “and He will be gracious to you” is the same as the expression used in the passuk in Shemos (33,19) “and I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious”, which the Gemora in Brachos 7a explains means that Hashem will be gracious to a person even though he is not deserving, and that is why there are wicked people who enjoy a good life. But there are Tzaddikim who suffer a hard life because He punishes them for their sins in this world. On this the ministering angels asked from the passuk “He shall show favor to you”, which implies that since they a righteous He will keep silent and not punish them even in this world. Hashem answered that since they are particular to make safeguards to the mitzvos He can show them favor and allow them to enjoy a good life even in this world.

Sapachas, Guf and Deshaf VeYashiv - Niddah 13

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Converts are like Sapachas

Rabbi Chelbo said: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as sapachas (a type of tzara’as).

Rashi explains that this is because converts are not so meticulous in the performance of mitzvos, and those Jews who observe this behavior will become influenced by them.

Tosfos writes that each and every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, and if converts do not perform mitzvos meticulously, they will be punished on account of them.

Tosfos rejects this explanation, for he proves that when the Jewish people accepted to be guarantors for each other, they did not accept to be guarantors for the converts as well.

Tosfos brings another explanation: They are harmful to the Jews, for it is impossible that someone will not bother them, and the punishment for this will be severe, for the Torah in twenty-four places warn the Jewish people not to bother the converts.

Tosfos brings another explanation: It is because of the converts that we are still in exile, for the Gemora says that Klal Yisroel are scattered all over the world much more so than other nations in order for there to be additional converts.

Rabbeinu Avraham the convert explains differently: It is because the converts are meticulous in their performance of the mitzvos. This shows the shortcomings of ordinary Jews.

DAILY MASHAL

Souls from the Guf

Rav Assi said: “The son of David will not come until all the souls are vacated from guf.” (There exists a chamber in heaven that contains the souls created during the six days of creation. The mitzvah of procreation is to bring the souls out of guf and advance the coming of Mashiach. One who has children fulfills this obligation even if they subsequently die.)

The Maharal writes that the souls which descend into this world before the Redemption are contained in a chamber called guf, body. This is because the souls residing in this world prior to the arrival of Mashiach have a connection to the body, the physical world. After the arrival of Mashiach, the souls will not be embedded inside the body; rather, they will be separate from the body.

The uniqueness and sacred status of the Deshaf Veyashiv Synagogue

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rabbi Yosef Karo wrote his Shulchan ‘Aruch as a decisive halachic work for everyone. Therefore, there are few places where he writes “we have a doubt”. One of the few halachos where he has a doubt as to how one should behave concerns the halachos of a synagogue (O.C. 151:12), where he writes that we are in doubt if the roof of a synagogue may be used for mundane purposes. This doubt already arose with the Rishonim, the Mordechai (Shabbos, Ch. 1) and the Maharik (Responsa, in shoresh 161), who discussed if the sanctity of a synagogue, regarded as a small Temple, extends to its roof just as the sanctity of the heichal in the Temple included its roof, or perhaps the halachah of a synagogue is like that of the ‘azarah (forecourt) in the Temple, which was sacred but not its roofs or upper floors.

Our sugya recounts that Shmuel and his pupil, Rav Yehudah, went up on the roof of the Deshaf Veyasiv Synagogue in Nehardea. They conversed, and Shmuel’s words indicated that where they were standing they shouldn’t worry about thoughts of sin as being in that place makes one feel scared and fearful and that keeps away such thoughts – one reason being the fear of the Shechinah present there. Can we decide Shulchan Aruch’s doubt from this case and contend that the roofs of synagogues are sacred? Once we realize the uniqueness of this synagogue, we’ll realize that it’s almost impossible.

A synagogue from Yerushalayim: The synagogue we are discussing was called Deshaf Veyasiv. Rashi comments (s.v. Deshaf veyasiv): “The name of a place included in the kingdom of Nehardea”. However, from other places in the Talmud where the synagogue is mentioned we learn that it was no ordinary synagogue at all. The Gemara in Megilah 29a says that the presence of the Shechinah in Babylonia was unique to this synagogue. The Shechinah’s voice was heard there and administering angels surrounded it. Rashi comments (ibid; Rosh HaShanah 24b; ‘Avodah Zarah 43b) that when Yechonyah, the king of Judea, was exiled to Babylonia, he brought along stones and earth from Yerushalayim and built this synagogue with them. Its name – Deshaf Veyasiv – derives from the fact that it “jumped” (shaf) from Yerushalayim and “settled” (yasiv) in Babylonia. Yechonyah’s act followed his moving parting from the Temple before his exile, of which we have learnt recently in tractate Midos (35b).

It is amazing to discover that while Rashi mentions that the synagogue was built of stones from Yerushalayim, in the ‘Aruch (in the entry for shaf) and the Geonim’s Responsa (71) it is mentioned that the synagogue was built with stones from the Temple! (See Responsa Chasam Sofer, Y.D. 264, where he wrote that we must say that their sanctity was desecrated by the conquest and destruction for if not so, there’s a prohibition of me’ilah).

Once we realize the special sanctity of the Deshaf Veyasiv Synagogue, it is easy to understand why the Rishonim and Shulchan ‘Aruch didn’t derive a decision from our Gemara, for this synagogue was especially sacred. Indeed, the Maharsha writes (in Chidushei Agados) that thoughts of sin were prevented in this synagogue due to its uniqueness and he defines its sanctity as “like in the Temple”!

Arachin Daf Gimmel

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The Obligation Of Women To Read The Megillah

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled: It is obligatory for women to hear the reading of the Megillah, because they benefited also by the same miracle (Haman’s decree to kill all the Jewish people included the women).

The Rishonim dispute whether a woman can read the Megillah and discharge the obligation for a man. Rashi maintains that she could and Tosfos cites a Behag that she cannot. There are those that explain the Behag that he holds that a woman is only obligated to hear the Megillah but not to read it. Rashi’s viewpoint is easily understood by the fact that the Gemora explicitly states that women are obligated in the reading of the Megillah. The Beis Yosef (O”C 689) writes that according to the Behag, the correct version in the Gemora is that women are obligated to hear the Megillah.

Mishna Berura (689:13) writes that the reason a woman cannot read the Megillah on behalf of a man is because it is similar to Kerias HaTorah, where a woman is disqualified because of public dignity.

The Eshkol offers a different explanation and states that a woman cannot read the Megillah for a man because of the prohibition of “kol b’isha ervoh.”

The Imrei Baruch explains the viewpoint of the Behag why women will only be obligated to hear the Megillah and not to read it. The Gemora below (14a) states that the prophets offered a kal vachomer argument in creating an obligation to read the Megillah. If the Jews, who were liberated from slavery in Mitzrayim and brought to freedom, sang praises to Hashem when they saw the Egyptians drowning; certainly we should commemorate our deliverance from death to life. That is why we read the Megillah publicly, where we are thanking Hashem for saving us from Haman’s decree. There is a distinction, however, between the way the men sang praise and the way the women sang. Moshe recited each phrase and all the male Jews repeated after him. The women did not sing; Miriam said each phrase and they responded with musical instruments, not with singing. According to this, we can say that the same distinction should apply by Megillah. The men, who sang songs of praise by the sea, have an obligation to read the Megillah; the women who only heard the songs of praise have an obligation to hear the Megillah, but not to read it.

Putting Tefillin on a Hat

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our sugya treats the prohibition of any chatzitzah – interruption, separating between the bigdei kehunah and a Kohen’s flesh, as we are told – “…and trousers of cloth he shall wear on his flesh,” interpreted by Chazal in our sugya as meaning, “nothing should interfere between it and his flesh.”

Shulchan ‘Aruch (O.C. 27:4) rules a similar halachah about tefillin: “Nothing should interfere between the tefillin and his flesh.” However, in the following paragraph Rabbi Yosef Kairo writes that for an ill person who must always cover his head, “we should allow him to place the head tefillin on the thin hat closest to his head; and he should cover it lest people see it.” Must tefillin be put on one’s skin or is it allowed to put them on a hat? It turns out that these two halachos are a sort of compromise in a difference of opinions among the Rishonim.

Our Gemora explains that the Kohanim did not don arm tefillin during their service in the Temple. They could not put the tefillin on their sleeves as the sleeve would be a chatzitzah between the tefillin and their flesh and they could not put them on under the sleeve as nothing must interrupt between the bigdei kehunah and their skin. The Rosh (Responsa, kelal 3, §4) proves therefrom that tefillin should not be put on a hat.

However, the Rashba inclines to believe that chatzitzah is not pertinent to head tefillin. In his opinion, the arm tefillin should not be put on a garment because of Chazal’s interpretation “a sign to you and not to others.” In other words, the arm tefillin should be under the garment and not on it. On the other hand, this interpretation does not apply to the head tefillin and therefore they may be put on a hat (Magen Avraham adds that if so, the arm tefillin may also be put on a garment if another garment covers them as, according to the Rashba, there is no chatzitzah in tefillin but the arm tefillin must be covered).

The two apparently contradictory paragraphs in Shulchan ‘Aruch are a compromise between the Rosh’s strict opinion and the Rashba’s lenient opinion. Therefore, Shulchan ‘Aruch rules according to the Rosh, that “nothing should interfere between the tefillin and his flesh.” But a person who cannot put on tefillin without chatzitzah may rely on the Rashba, on condition that people do not see him and learn from his custom (and he should also not pronounce a berachah on the head tefillin).

It is still not clear as to why a sick person may put tefillin only on a thin hat. Is a thin hat less of a chatzitzah than a thick one? Mishnah Berurah (S.K. 19) explains that the difference does not stem from chatzitzah but because a thick hat would interfere with the person’s putting the tefillin in their exact position on the head.

DAILY MASHAL

STORY FROM THE DAF

An amazing story is told about the exact observation of mitzvos heeded by HaGaon Rav Y.Y. Weiss zt”l, av beis din of the Eidah Chareidis in Yerushalayim and author of Minchas Yitzchak. Because of his heart ailment, the doctors left an opening in a vein in his left arm with a small pipe, such that in time of need they could inject him immediately. Rav Weiss did not agree to this chatzitzah, though he was bedridden, and every morning he removed the pipe, though this involved loss of blood and excruciating pain. During a senior doctor’s visit, Rav Weiss remarked that the injections could be performed in a different way, not involving chatzitzah. The doctor agreed and for a long while told everyone about the “rabbi professor.”

Yearning to Return to Zion

It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: “this man, this man, was born in her,” and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)

Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.

I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).

During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed. These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.

Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt”l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav’s opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. “It is certainly permitted!”

“But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?” the questioner asked.
Rav Sonnenfeld explained, “This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, ‘And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.’ The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word “man, each and every man” that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!”

I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.

The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt”l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one’s life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.

This can be proven from Rashi’s commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram’s wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram’s dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.

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Insights and More on Daf 11

The Lots for the Goats

The halachah that that the lot (for the two goats) does not assign the goat to Azazel unless it is fit to be the one offered to Hashem can be explained in two ways. Either, that it is a law in the assigning of the lot - to be regarded as a proper lot - they both have to be fit for the chatas which will be offered to Hashem - if one is found to be a tereifah, it is a deficient lot; or perhaps there is an inherent law that the goat being sent to Azazel must be fit to be offered as the chatas for Hashem; a tereifah is therefore disqualified from being the goat sent to Azazel, and that is why it is not considered a lot.

Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz Heoros says that a practical difference between the two explanations is if it became a tereifah after the lot. According to the first explanation it is valid because at the time of the lot it was not a tereifah. According to the second understanding, it is still invalid because the goat being sent to Azazel cannot be a tereifah.

As they Intended

The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:

1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.

2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

DAILY MASHAL

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Most Drunkards

HaGaon Rabbi Yehonasan Eibeschitz zt”l was once asked by a gentile king why he doesn’t convert as gentiles constitute a majority as compared to the Jews. He replied that a majority is only used in case of a doubt but not when the situation is definite. Though this is true, there’s another simple answer. A hundred drunkards do not outweigh one chacham and who is like the wise of Israel who are pure of ulterior motives? (HaGaon E. Wasserman, Beiurei Agadaos ‘al Derech HaPeshat).

From Sacrifices

to Honoring One’s Father

The source of the halachah of the majority stems from sacrifices, which are offered without worrying about treifos. Maharal Tzintz writes that it is possible that we can thus explain the verse “And you will sanctify him for he offers the bread of your G-d” (Vayikra 21:8). You should sanctify the kohen and if you have a doubt if he is a kohen lest his declared father is not his true father (see Chulin 11b: “…and maybe he is not his father”), the answer is “for he offers the bread of your G-d” – learn from sacrifices that we should follow the majority and if so, he’s certainly his father and you should sanctify him (Melo Ha’Omer).

Who Distinguishes Between the Holy and the Mundane

Our sugya says that the two goats of Yom Kippur, the chatas and the goat for Azazel, must be equal. This teaches us that the holy and the mundane are likely to be equal, almost without any difference. How much must we concentrate to know what is holy and what is mundane! (Leket Amarim).

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Chullin Daf Beis

Tractate Chulin: Hakol Shochatin

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

With Hashem’s help we have finished Menachos and now we pass from the realm of kodshim to the realm of chullin - the mundane. Chullin is one of the longest tractates in the Talmud and its sugyos treat practical and most important subjects. It is one of the most varied tractates as it addresses a number of utterly different topics and therefore learners find much interest and satisfaction because of the many concepts they discover.

The tractate before us: First we shall learn the details of slaughtering, without which an animal is a neveilah. In the third chapter we shall learn about the signs of treifah and the signs of kashrus of land animals, fish and locusts. In the next chapter we shall complete different details of the topics learnt in the previous chapters and especially concerning the embryo of a slaughtered animal (ben peku’ah) and the impurity of a neveilah. Further on, the chapters are full of different subjects accompanying slaughtering and kashrus. In Chapter 5 we shall examine the details of the negative mitzvah not to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day and in the next chapter we shall explore the mitzvah to cover up the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or fowl. In Chapter 7 we shall learn about the prohibition of gid hanasheh and Chapter 8 is devoted to the prohibition of meat and milk. In these chapters we shall also become aware of the great questions of mixtures. The halachos of a limb from a live animal and the impurity of a neveilah are detailed in Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10 and 11 we shall learn halachos concerning gifts to kohanim. The final chapter addresses the mitzvah of shiluach haken (chasing away a mother bird before taking its eggs).

After we finish chullin, we shall again learn about kodshim. chullin is like an island of matters of mundane meat among the tractates dealing with kodshim and some say that it is therefore called chullin or Shechitas chullin, as Rashi often calls it. Rambam (in the preface to his commentary on the Mishnah) explains that chullin was placed after Zevachim and Menachos because the Torah also treats the halachos of sacrifices and then addresses eating mundane meat: “Yet as much as you desire you shall slaughter and eat meat” (Devarim 12:15).

Who is fit to be a shochet?

In the first paragraph of the first chapter of Yoreh De’ah the Remo details who is fit to serve as a shochet: “He shouldn’t slaughter, though he is an expert and knows the halachos of shechitah, till he slaughters three times before a chacham expert in the halachos of shechitah, so that he knows that he is expert and will not faint (Tur in the name of Rambam). Therefore, we are accustomed that no one slaughters unless he received a kabalah (approval to slaughter) from a chacham. The chacham does not grant him a kabalah unless he knows that he knows the halachos of shechitah and is expert with his hands. Therefore we are accustomed to rely on anyone who comes to slaughter (that he surely received a kabalah)… and in some places they have the custom to be stricter, that the recipient takes a written kabalah as proof. Every shochet, though he has a kabalah, should review the halachos of shechitah from time to time, that he should be expert in them not to forget them (Rav Yaakov HaLevi in the name of the Maharash). The same applies to the halachos of examining the lungs and to the bodeik - the person who examines - their halachah and custom are equal in this entire matter. And the beis din should inspect the bodekim and shochetim to see that they should be expert and kosher (Mahariu, 50) for the hazard of any transgression concerning shechitah and bedikah, accessible to everyone, is immense.”

How often must he review of the halachos of shechitah: When the Remo said “from time to time”, he meant that a shochet should review the halachos every month! (Baer Heiteiv, S.K. 8). Beer HaGolah wrote in the Maharil’s name that during the first 30 days of his position a shochet should review the halachos of slaughtering and examination every day. After the first 30 days he should review them every 30 days and when he completes his first year, he should review them once in a while but if he doesn’t do so, his slaughtering is disqualified!

ShUB: shochet ubodek: It has always been known that a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person and the title Shub, the initials of shochet ubodek is a source of pride to many, such that some adopted it as their family name. The need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing slaughterer is not mere stringency but concerns the basic halachos of slaughtering, as follows.

The three phases of shechitah: The process of rendering an animal fit to eat by shechitah consists of three phases: (1) examining the knife, (2) slaughtering, (3) examining the lungs.

Examining the knife: Rabeinu Yonah writes in his Sha’arei Teshuvah (sha’ar 3, os 96) that examining the knife demands extreme scrupulous care: “And regarding someone who is not conscientious, his heart will not understand to be meticulous about examining the knife for he must greatly concentrate all his attention on his examination. You will see that a person sometimes checks two or three times without detecting a slight fault and then he finds it, for he concentrated the last time.” Indeed, the task of examining the knife was given to the chacham or Rabbi and a shochet who didn’t show his knife to the Rabbi before slaughtering would be ostracized (chullin 18a)! Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 18:17) maintains that in later eras the custom arose to appoint special people for this task and the Rabbi relinquishes his honor to them as they are scrupulously careful. In fact, the author of Shulchan Aruch HaRav (18, Kuntres Acharon, S.K. 9) maintains that the Rabbanim only relinquished their honor for G-d-fearing people but others are not allowed to examine knives!

Slaughtering: One witness is believed regarding prohibitions (chullin 10b), as opposed to halachos of property and marriage, which require at least two witnesses. According to the Reem, one witness is still not believed to testify that an animal was properly slaughtered as, opposing his testimony there is a chazakah (previous knowledge) of prohibition to eat the (unslaughtered) animal, and one witness is not believed against a chazakah. Only a witness known to be faithful and kosher may testify (Mordechai, chullin, §579). There is therefore a need for a G-d-fearing shochet because otherwise, if he slaughtered an animal alone, he is not believed to testify that he slaughtered it properly. We emphasize that the Reem’s opinion was not accepted as halachah (see Pri Megadim in the preface and „Aroch HaShulchan, 4). But all the poskim repeatedly warn that we must eat from the shechitah of a G-d-fearing and scrupulous shochet, as Baer Heiteiv asserts (S.K. 29): “Not to give a kabalah to anyone who is frivolous but only to the G-d-fearing.”

Examining the lungs: An examination of the lungs is conducted to eliminate the possibility of a hole or another disorder of the lung, rendering the animal treifah. Though most animals are not treifah, one must examine the lungs because of the frequency of treifos (Shach, ibid) and Shulchan Aruch warns (Y.D. 39:1): “Anyone who breaches the fence - to eat without examination - should be bitten by a snake.”

Only the G-d-fearing may be lenient: Regarding two types of suspected treifah that could occur in a lung, Shulchan Aruch states (ibid, se’if 11 and 13) that in certain instances we may be lenient but he limits his statement: “We rely on this leniency only in case of an outstandingly G-d-fearing and kosher examiner.” We thus see that the need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing ShuB is essential, as otherwise one must not be lenient.

DAILY MASHAL

A Fast

The Chasam Sofer zt”l decreed a fast in his yeshivah before learning chullin according to Sefer Chasidim (261 and 1012; Mekor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim, 261, remark 6). Some believe that the reason is because of the danger that arises when a person demonstrates the matters of slaughtering and treifos on his own body (Sichas chullin in the preface, according to the Maharsha, Gitin, end of 57b).

What Is an Outstandingly G-d-fearing Person?

As explained in the article “Who Is Fit to Slaughter”, a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person (yerei shamayim meirabim). People say in the name of the Belzer Rebbe that an outstandingly G-d-fearing person means that he must practice every stringency practiced by two people in his town as the least number of rabim (many) is two!

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Join the “NEW” Kedushas Tefillin Project - Daf 35

by R’ Zev Busel

ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששן ויקר - the Yidden experienced light and joy, delight and honor. The Gemora in Meseches Megillah tells us that (more…)

Daily Mashal - Zevachim 90

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This is the Law of an Olah

It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.

The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.

[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.

The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.

The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.

The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.

The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]

The Order of Serving Hashem

Our Gemora explains that a chatas should be sacrificed before an „olah but that the Torah put the verses of the „olah before those of the chatas because “for its reading, the Torah gave precedence to it”. Rashi (s.v. Lemikraah) comments: “that it should be read in the subject (of offerings) first” and Tosfos wonder (s.v. Lemikraah): “What kind of chidush is this?” HaGaon Rav Eliyahu Dessler zt”l writes that we can explain Rashi thus: In the order of sacrifices – i.e., in the practical phases of serving Hashem, the chatas – the rectification of sins – precedes the „olah – achieving high levels. But “for its reading” – i.e., to know and perceive high levels – “the Torah gave precedence to it” as even before the sinner finishes rectifying his sins, he should be familiar with all the levels. One cannot serve Hashem from a narrow viewpoint but one must be aware of all the stages of serving Hashem and the high levels that one must strive to achieve (Michtav MeEliyahu, III 174).

Miracle of the fire - Zevachim 89

Our Mishna says that one must first burn the limbs of an ‘olah and then the parts of a chatas. At the inauguration of the altar in the Sanctuary, the Torah says that they put the ‘olah on the altar and, above it, the parts of the other sacrifices (Vayikra 9). But when the fire came out from before Hashem and “consumed on the altar”, the verse says that it consumed the “’olah and the fats.” In other words, first the fire burned the ‘olah and then the fats above the ‘olah! The Netziv writes that this was a miracle to observe the halachah that the limbs of an ‘olah are burnt before the parts of other sacrifices (Ha’amek Davar, Shemini).

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Ramps to the Mishkan - Zevachim 62

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Rav Yehudah said: Two small ramps branched off from the main ramp, by which one (on the west side) turned to the base and one (on the east side) to the ledge, and these were also separated from the altar by a hairsbreadth, because it is written: around.

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, notes: This is referring to the altar in the Beis HaMikdash. It is logical to assume that there would also be one to the ledge in the Mishkan if the ledge in the Mishkan was for the Kohanim to walk upon. According to Rashi in Chumash there was no ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan, so there was no need for a small ramp to the ledge. There are commentators that maintain that there was a ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan (page 234), so according to them there was a need for a small ramp to the ledge.

Regarding if in the Mishkan there was a small ramp to the base, according to what Shitah Mekubetzes (letter 12) that the purpose of the small ramp to the base was because if the Kohen would have to go down the ramp and then go to the base, the blood might coagulate and become unfit for sprinkling, it would seem that there should also be one in the Mishkan. Even though it would seem that the ramp in the Mishkan was a little shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, it is not logical to say that since the ramp in the Mishkan was a few amos shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, there would be no concern that the blood would coagulate. According to what we have written, it seems that there was only one small ramp in the Mishkan,

Traveling with the Fire on the Altar - Zevachim 61

The Gemora says that the fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Moshe did not depart from the copper Altar until the time of Shlomo. The fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Shlomo did not depart until Menashe and removed it.

Kollel Iyun HaDaf <a href=”http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm”>http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm</a> poses the following question: Rashi in his commentary on Chumash (Shemos 30:3) cites the Mechilta which contrasts the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores to the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes. The verse says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores had a solid top, while, says the Mechilta, the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did not have such a top. The Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes was transported merely as a frame, and at each stop in the desert its hollow interior was filled with dirt. The Netziv (Shemos 27:2) therefore questions Rashi’s words from the Gemora here, which states that the fire descended and stayed on the Mizbe’ach. If the earth inside of the hollow of the Mizbe’ach was removed and the Mizbe’ach dismantled each time the Jewish people embarked on a new journey, then where was the fire?

HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, answers as follows: Firstly, according to the Malbim (Shemos 20, posuk 21) there is an argument in Mechilta whether the Mizbe’ach was carried with the dirt or not. The Malbim also brings another dispute if the fire was on the Mizbe’ach when they traveled or not. The Malbim explains that if the fire remained, then the Mizbe’ach was filled with dirt when they carried it. If it did not remain, then it was carried without dirt.

According to the Shitah Mekubetzes on our Daf (letter 6), in the time they traveled, the fire rested on the edge of the Mizbe’ach.

According to Raaviah (chelek sheini Maseches Chagigah siman 808), the fire rested on a clump of dirt carried with the Mizbe’ach.

According to Anaf Yosef on Tanchuma (Terumah 11) they put a tablet on the Mizbe’ach and it rested on it.

According to Tosafos HaSaleim (Shemos 38, 6-7, letter 1), even according to Rashi, the Mizbe’ach HaNechshes had a top.

The Kollel cites the following answers: The Netziv explains that the Gemora argues with the Mechilta and maintains that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did have a top on which the fire rested even during the journeys. He finds support for this assertion in the Midrash Tanchuma. He explains that the way the Mizbe’ach was filled with earth was through the bottom of the Mizbe’ach, which had no floor. Upon their arrival at a new location, the Jewish people would make a mound of earth and place the Mizbe’ach over it, effectively filling the Mizbe’ach with earth. When they would leave, they would lift the Mizbe’ach, leaving the earth in its place.

This also seems to be the opinion of the Kereisi u’Pleisi (43:5). The Gemora in Chagigah (27a) derives through a kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav that the fire of Gehinom does not affect the transgressors among the Jewish people. Even though the gold covering the top of the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was only the thickness of a dinar coin, it was not diminished at all throughout the years that it had a fire burning on it. Certainly, then, the transgressors among the Jewish people — who are full of mitzvos like a pomegranate — will not be affected by the fire of Gehinom (see Insights to Chagigah 27a).

Tosfos in Chagigah there (DH she’Ein) is bothered by a question, as the Kereisi u’Pleisi explains his words. Why does the Gemora learn this kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav, and not from the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes? The only thing offered on the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was the incense offering, which was burned there once at the beginning of the day and once at the end of the day. There was much more activity on the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes, which had a fire on it at all times, and it too had a coating of gold that did not diminish!

Since the Kereisi u’Pleisi says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had a coating of gold on its top, it is clear that he maintains that the Mizbe’ach had a top, like its counterpart, the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav.

The Gemora here may be understood even according to Rashi’s assertion that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had no top, based on the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes (#6). Rashi here (DH Lo Nistalkah) comments that while the Jewish people traveled in the desert, they used to turn a certain type of vessel over the fire on the Mizbe’ach to preserve the fire. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:10; see Rash mi’Shantz), and not the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who says that the fire was removed from the Mizbe’ach. This is also the way Rashi explains in Bamidbar (4:13), where he says that the cover of the Mizbe’ach was not burned by the fire underneath it while traveling, due to the vessel which was placed over the fire. If there was no actual top to the Mizbe’ach, though (but rather its frame was filled to the top with earth), and the earth inside of it was removed when the people traveled, where could they place the vessel to contain the fire? The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that they placed the vessel “over the edge” of the Mizbe’ach. This means that the fire on the Mizbe’ach remained on top of the frame of the Mizbe’ach, covered by this vessel.

Eighty Replies to One Question - Zevachim 47

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and Many of our Subscribers

Our Gemora states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes piggul. In his opinion, not only a Kohen can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of piggul (that it will be eaten not in its proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.

A question that originated in the beis midrash of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his Sedei Chemed, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding talmidei chachamim in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work Gevuros Shemonim which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of Beis HaOtzar, Asvan D’oraisa, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.

The question: If the owner causes piggul, we cannot test a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the Kohen has to offer the minchah (Sotah 23a, s.v. Kol) that she must bring. The sotah, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the minchah to be piggul and without offering the minchah, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that piggul can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that piggul is caused only by speech, the sotah can be prevented from saying anything.

She can be taken out of the ‘Azarah: The fifth of the 80 answers is based on Tosfos (above, 29a, s.v. Lamakom), who assert that a thought of piggul disqualifies a sacrifice only in the ‘Azarah. If so, the sotah can be taken out of the ‘Azarah while the minchah is offered. To force her to say the opposite: In the 37th answer, Rav Engel advises that the woman be forced to say explicitly that the minchah will be eaten in its proper time and place. From then on, even if she thinks frantically that it should be piggul, she cannot disqualify anything (according to Pesachim 63a).

The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our sugya (s.v. Shama’ti), that the owner causes piggul only if the Kohen remains silent. But if the Kohen announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause piggul.

Piggul applies only to shelamim and todos: Rav Zeev Yitzchak HaLevi Dünner of Germany offered the answer that the owner can cause piggul only concerning shelamim and todos, whose meat they eat, but not regarding an asham, chatas orminchah, of which they do not partake (and see ibid, answer 4).

It would appear that the concept of the owner causing piggul is not relevant to the sotah’s minchah. The Gemora (36a; see Rashi ad loc. s.v. Hachi Garsinan Lishna Acharina) says that piggul, which entails intending to eat or burn the korban at the wrong time, only applies if the one causing the piggul can actually do it at the wrong time. But if he himself cannot, intending that others will do it at the wrong time is meaningless. Accordingly, the halachah that the owner can cause piggul would only apply to shelamim and the like, where the owner will indeed be eating the meat, so it is up to him to intend to eat it at the wrong time. But when it comes to the minchah, the woman will not be burning the minchah, nor will she be eating it. All she can do is intend that the Kohen burn or eat it at the wrong time, and that is meaningless.

Let’s remember that the woman is not the sole owner, as the husband is the one “sponsoring” the korban for her, which has many halachic ramifications. Accordingly, it is quite likely that the husband is the one who would have the jurisdiction over the piggul, just as we see in Bava Kama Daf 13a-b that when one person sponsors a korban for another, the sponsor is entitled to the meat.

Rashi writes that the owner can render it piggul if the Kohen had no intent, implying that if the Kohen explicitly intended the proper thought, the owner’s thought would not count. This makes sense, considering that the source for the owner’s power to cause piggul is that he too is called a makriv, but as a makriv, he is definitely secondary to the Kohen. Accordingly, in the case of the sotah, the solution is to ensure that the Kohen specifically intends the right thought.

The most obvious answer seems to be that she cannot overpower the intention of the Kohen doing the avodah. You will note that Rashi says that the owner can cause piggul if he has piggul intention and the Kohen kept quiet. From here it seems that if the Kohen has an active intention the owner’s intention cannot take effect.

Perhaps, since it’s not b’yadah to eat it chutz l’zmano or to be makriv it chutz l’mkomo, she cannot make it piggul.

The Torah says that the husband shall bring her to the Kohen, and therefore it’s his korban not hers.

Perhaps because she would benefit personally from piggul, therefore she does not have believability.

Only an innocent woman will actually drink the waters, so as to prove her innocence. Accordingly, she wouldn’t cause it to become piggul.

The Torah says (Bamidbor 5,15) “Veheivi”, which means that the husband brings the minchah, so what makes the wife the owner? And even if the waving (of the minchah) is done by the wife, so what? The Kohen had to do the waving with her as well so he is the owner as well?

In Sotah 19, the Chachamim say (and so is the halachah) that first she drinks and then they start with the minchah. There was no chance to cause piggul before drinking, and R’ Shimon says the minchah was first, but who says that he agrees with Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi?

It would seem to me that if she deliberately has machsheves piggul, she would not be believed to say so since ain odom maysim atzmo rasha. (I assume it is forbidden to deliberately invalidate a korban, and especially to prevent them from fulfilling dinei sotah). The only possible case is if the person says he accidentally had machsheves piggul.

Who said the woman is the owner of the korban. Perhaps it’s being brought for her, not by her, and she can’t cause the piggul.

If we’re concerned that she’ll try to get out of drinking she could do it in an easier way by admitting she was guilty. This would forbid her to her husband, but no death penalty.

Who said the wife is the owner of the minchah? Doesn’t the husband pay for it and have to “bring her”? Isn’t he the owner?

The first though that occurs to me is whether in fact the korban minchah prevents the sotah from drinking, or is it considered a separate and distinct aspect of the overall process, so that even if it invalidated it, she could still drink?

There is a halachah that if the accused sotah declares that she will not drink, then the korban minchah must be burned. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, if she is completely silent, we need not be concerned with the possibility of her having a piggul thought, since she did not verbally refuse to drink. Obviously, she feels that she is innocent, and is willing to do ahead with the entire process - including both a proper hakravah of the korban and the drinking.

Rashi there says ‘if the Kohen is quiet while being mekabel…’ – this sounds like the only then does the owner capable of rendering it piggul. Therefore here where there is a concern we’ll just have the Kohen speak out the correct time and day… and therefore even the Rambam will agree that her intention cannot override or have any impact to the Kohen’s expression.

Do we see anywhere that we suspect someone to deliberately render something piggul – is it not kares?

If there is this concern then R’ Chaim Berlin should ask more – how can the Kohen continue to do the different avodah’s on an animal which is suspect to be piggul?

Saying Eizehu Mekoman before Prayer

For very many years it has been the custom to say the Mishna of our chapter, Eizehu mekoman, before shacharis. The Tur (O.C. 50) bases the custom on the halachah that every day one should learn Torah (Written), Mishna and Talmud (Kiddushin 30a). Therefore we say the parashah of the tamid and the verses dealing with the sacrifices for the portion of Torah, Eizehu mekoman for Mishna and Rabbi Yishmael’s braisa for the portion of Talmud. Our chapter was chosen from the 524 chapters of Mishna because the Gemora in Menachos 110a praises those who learn about sacrifices (see Perishah, ibid, S.K. 2 and 4).

Beis Yosef (ibid) cites another reason in the name of the Raah: “because there is no disagreement in the whole chapter and it is a clear Mishna handed down from Moshe from Mount Sinai”. In other words, this chapter does not contain even one difference of opinions and therefore we assume that it has been handed down from Moshe in its present form (Peninim Mishulchan HaGra, end of Shemos, and the Noda’ BiYeudah wrote likewise in Doresh LeTziyon, derush 11). Some also prove thus from the phrasing of the Mishna in this chapter, which evidences its antiquity, as we are told: “…and they are eaten within the curtains (kla’im)”. Curtains were not in the Temple but in the Sanctuary (mishkan). Therefore, the Tanaim did not formulate this Mishna but it originates from the generation of the desert (see Otzar HaTefilos, p. 81 in the remark, and Tiferes Yisrael on our chapter, os 22). ‘Ateres Zekeinim on Shulchan ‘Aruch (ibid) states that the words of this chapter amount to 344 and when we add 1 for reading, we arrive at the numerical equivalent for Moshe – a hint that this chapter was given to Moshe at Mount Sinai in its present phrasing.

Is it really true, many wondered, that there is no difference of opinions in the chapter? Our Gemora explains that the Mishna’s statement, that the pesach is eaten only till midnight, is only according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and not according to Rabbi Akiva (see Pri Megadim, ibid, in Eishel Avraham, and see Yeshu’as Ya’akov, S.K. 1). Indeed, the Ritva, the great pupil of the Raah, indicates (Avodah Zarah 19b) that Raah did not mean that this chapter was given to Moshe in its present form but “since the whole chapter is learnt with no difference of opinions mentioned at all, it should be learnt more than other chapters”.

HaGaon Rav Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, who expands on the topic (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, IX, 5), cites the reason of Orchos Chayim (Dinei Meah Berachos, os 16), that this chapter includes the secret of all the sacrifices. Yesod Veshoresh Ha’Avodah says: “A person scrutinizing the writings of the Ari z”l will realize its great import, that every Mishna of this chapter is a rectification (tikun) in itself in the high worlds” (see Tzitz Eli’ezer, ibid).

To conclude, we should mention the statement of Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Lyadi zt”l (Responsa HaGraz, 1:9), that as saying Eizehu mekoman before prayer was mainly instituted so that a person should learn something each day, a person “who can learn and understand does not have to say the parashah of the sacrifices each day but to say it sometimes suffices”.

DAILY MASHAL

How Could You Write a Book on Eizehu Mekoman?

A person who wrote a commentary on Eizehu mekoman came with his book to Rebbe Baruch of Mezhbuzh for an approbation. The Rebbe replied, “I wonder how you could write such a commentary. When I come to this chapter, I begin to imagine bringing sacrifices to the Temple and the service of the kohanim. My stomach turns over and I’m full of tribulations and suffering” (Ma’yanah shel Mishna).

What Is a Sacrifice?

Our Mishna says “What is the place of the sacrifices?” – i.e., all the sacrifices. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra writes in his commentary on the Torah (Shemos 20:20): “I saw an apostate…who challenged the chachamim because they said „What is the place of the sacrifices (zevachim)‟. He said that in all the Torah he found zevichah referring only to shelamim, such as „‘olah uzevachim as an ‘olah is a thing for itself and the zevachim are shelamim, as in „…and they offered ‘olos and slaughtered zevachim shelamim” (Shemos 24:5) and thus we find everywhere. I showed him that he wasn’t speaking correctly as we are told: „…and you will slaughter (vezavachta) on it your ‘olos and shelamim.” He then admitted to his sin…that he had disputed men greater than all following generations”

Sh’vuos 16 - Story on the Daf - Walled City

The Gemora states that the terms Mishkan and Mikdash are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term Mishkan or always using the term Mikdash. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.

Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rand the doorbell one evening at the Miller’s home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller’s family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, “Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?”

Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. “I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time,” Rabbi Stein said. “The opposite is true,” declared Mr. Miller. “Let me share with you something.

Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving tzedakah. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give tzedakah, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time.”

This story teaches us that there is a Mikdash, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a Mishkan, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of tzedakah, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.

Sent out of a Walled City

The Gemora mentions that there is a special sanctity regarding cities in Eretz Yisroel that were surrounded by a wall in the times of Yehoshua. Rashi writes some of these halachos: One who sells a house inside a walled city has one year to redeem the house, but if he chooses not to redeem the house, it becomes the property of the buyer permanently; sending a metzora outside the city; and that the open space (1,000 cubits) surrounding the city should be left uncultivated.

Why does a Metzora need to leave a city that is surrounded by a wall, but may otherwise remain in all other cities–as long as they are unwalled?  The Be’er Yosef provides a fascinating p’shat based on the Chazal in Erachin (15b) which states that Hashem provided for the tongue two protections — two walls: one of flesh–the lips, and one of bone–the teeth.  A metzora breached his very own walls of protection by speaking lashon hora; he cannot therefore remain in a city protected by a wall!

Hakhel Note:  An average city has only one wall–yet Hashem in his benevolence gives us a truly enhanced fortification–a dual safeguard!  How can a person be so imprudent, so unwise, so as to take down not only one wall made for his own protection–but two!  We will add one other point, as well.  One of the most famous Metzora scenes in Tanach is that of Gechazi and his sons outside the city of Shomron (the Haftorah for Parshas Metzora)–perhaps a lesson to us that the sin of Lashon Hora is easily spread within or among a family(Miriam and Aharon speaking regarding Moshe Rabbeinu provides a similar lesson)–and this may be why it is easier to succeed at taking down the ‘double wall’–it is an unfortunate and misguided team effort, and one family member encourages the next in what to the casual observer may otherwise be described as a self-defeating struggle.  If one sees a weakness in his family–or in a particular family member (even if that family member is himself) — he should bolster the fortifications–so that the security of the entire family is not breached–and the lips and tongue can take their noble places in protecting home, life and family!

Gezeirah Shavah and Poetry - Shevuos Daf 7

Gezeirah shavah

Rava praises Rebbe for his connection of olah v’yored with the prohibition on an impure person eating kodesh, by a gezeirah shavah – a common phrase, since behemah temai’ah – non kosher animal is used in both sections. Tosfos Harosh (7a Doleh) asks why this is so praiseworthy, as one can only use such the textual device of gezeirah shavah if he learned it from his teacher. Therefore, Rebbe must have learned this from his teacher, and showed no innovation. Tosfos Harosh answers that all that one learns from his teacher is the common phrase of the gezeirah shavah, but it is up to the student to know which phrases to use, and what to learn. It is Rebbi’s application of the gezeirah shavah which Rava praised.

Rhymes Purer Than Gold

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

The Chasam Sofer revered his mentor – “the great eagle,” Rabbi Nasan Adler zt”l. We see his admiration in a poem he composed in his honor, whose beginning copies the style of our sugya, in which Rava praises Rebbe. The interesting rhymes are written in a style now unknown.

He draws water from deep wells

From him they built eternal ruins; he establishes the institutions of each generation.

His words raise those who falter and are sweeter than honey and mead.

The master’s mouth emits flashes of fire, desirable more than refined gold.

The great Kohen – we shall seek Torah, judgment and rulings from him.

He is the teacher who quenches the thirst of the parched, like flowing water-brooks.

The light of Israel, the strong hammer, cast solid as lustrous bronze,

Nasan the Kohen, a tzadik above chasidim and tzadikim.

He is the great eagle who hovers over his nestlings, his veteran students.

Wings of a dove coated in silver and its wings are like brilliant green-gold

And I am among the young, not from the seasoned,

But from the fragile kids (Responsa Chasam Sofer, Y.D. 167).

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The Chosen City - Makkos Daf 19

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The Gemora analyzes Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion: If he maintains that the initial sanctity of the Beis HaMikdash was sanctified for its time and for all future time, then it should even be permitted for a bechor to be brought as a sacrifice and be eaten in Yerushalayim? And if he holds that the initial sanctity of the Beis HaMikdash was sanctified for its time but not for all future time (and therefore nowadays there is no sanctity), then his inquiry (regarding ma’aser sheini) should have been relevant to a bechor as well (if a bechor was slaughtered while the Beis HaMikdash was in existence, and then it was destroyed, may it be eaten in Yerushalayim)? [Why was the halachah of bechor obvious to Rabbi Yishmael, but not the halachah regarding ma’aser sheini?]

Ravina answers: In truth, Rabbi Yishmael holds that the initial sanctity of the Beis HaMikdash was sanctified for its time but not for all future time, and here the reference is to the following case: The blood from a bechor was sprinkled before the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, and then it was destroyed, and the meat was still present (and ready to be eaten). Rabbi Yishmael compares the meat of the bechor to its blood: when the blood may be sprinkled on the Altar, the meat may be eaten as well (but since now there is no Altar and the blood cannot be sprinkled, the meat may not be eaten either). And then he compares ma’aser sheini to bechor.

Tosfos (in Megillah 10a) cites the opinion of Rabbeinu Chaim that even if one maintains that the initial sanctification of the Beis HaMikdash was not for all time and it would be forbidden to offer sacrifices on the site of the Temple Altar, one is nonetheless prohibited from offering a sacrifice on a private altar.

Rashi disagrees and holds that if the sanctity of the Beis HaMikdash ceased by its destruction, it would be permitted to offer sacrifices on a private altar nowadays.

The commentators ask on Rabbeinu Chaim: If the sanctity ceased after the destruction, why would it be forbidden to offer sacrifices on a private altar? After the destruction of Shiloh, bamos became permitted, so why not after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash?

Minchas Chinuch (254:7) writes that although Yerushalayim has lost its sanctity in regards to offering sacrifices and eating kodoshim, the city remains the “chosen place” and the third Beis HaMikdash will be built there. This is why private altars are still forbidden. This is the distinction between Shiloh and Yerushalayim. Shiloh was not the chosen city and when the Tabernacle was destroyed, there was no vestige of sanctity left in the city and bamos became permitted. Minchas Chinuch states that this is the explanation as to why we are still subject to a prohibition of fearing the Mikdash nowadays, since it is still the chosen place although it has not retained its sanctity.

Atonement of an Olah - Makkos 17

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Rabbi Yosi HaGelili (Yoma 36) states that a korban olah is brought for the sin of not giving the poor people from your grain, which one is obligated to do. Rabbi Akiva disagrees and holds that a korban olah is brought to atone for transgressing a positive commandment. Chazal say that an olah is a doron - a present to Hashem. The Seforim say that an olah shows a tremendous amount of love between the person and Hashem. The Ramban writes that when one brings a chatas or an asham, he should feel as if he is bringing himself as a sacrifice, for in truth, that is what he deserves. By an olah, it is as if he is giving himself to Hashem out of love.

How do we reconcile an olah being a present and a sign of love with the fact that Chazal say it is brought for transgressing certain sins?

The Aruch L’neir (Makkos 17b) explains the Ritva. The Gemora contrasts a chatas and asham that is coming for atonement and an olah is not. The Ritva asks from the Gemora in Yoma and Zevachim that it does provide forgiveness for some sins, and he answers that when one brings an olah as a donation, it atones for those sins.

Reb Chaim HaQoton elaborates: Rashi, quoting the Midrash, explains that an olah sacrifice is an atonement for one who violates a positive commandment or for one who violates a negative commandment and fails to perform the positive commandment that is supposed to rectify the negative commandment. Rashi explains, in a point further explained by Nachmanides and Rabbi Yaakov Ettlinger, that one is never obligated to bring a olah as an atonement, rather, if one does, he attains his atonement.

Tosfos write that after bringing an olah one’s atonement is “floating. Rabbi Meir Lublin explains that the Tosafists mean that an olah offering only atones for lenient sins, not for the more strict and severe sins.

Rabbi Shlomo Luria explains that the atonement is “floating” inasmuch as the atonement does not occur automatically when one offers an olah sacrifice, rather one must first perform teshuvah (repentance) and return to God before the offering of the sacrifice will complete its powers of atonement.

His words echo that of Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher who explains that the olah only serves as atonement for failing to perform a positive commandment or violating a negative commandment which is to be repaired by a positive commandment, if one repents from one’s sin.

Other Tosafists write that the olah offers an atonement for one who sinned and never knew of his sin. According to this explanation, obviously one cannot be obligate to being an olah for such a sin, because if he never knew about his sin, how can he be obliged to offer a sacrifice to atone for it? Rather, if one brought an olah offering, then it atones for sins unbeknown to him, but if he did not bring one, he is not required to do so. Another Midrash says that an olah is an atonement for one who thinks about sinning and thus has sinned with his intellect, not for one who violates a positive commandment.

Eidim and Hasra’ah - Makkos Vav

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The Purpose of Hasra’ah

By: Rabbi Avi Lebowitz

The Gemora cites various verses as the source for the requirement of hasra’ah (warning).

The Maharatz Chayus points out that there are two sources for hasra’ah. The first is a sevara, - this serves to make sure that the person is aware of the severity and consequences of his actions. Included in the hasra’ah is both the education of the halachah, and the awareness of the action that he is about to do. The second source is the verses that the Gemora quotes which serve as a gezeiras hakasuv, whether they apply or not, that no punishment can be carried out unless there is a warning.

The Maharatz Chayus deduces this from Tosfos who is bothered why the Gemora has to find a source for hasra’ah, to which they answer that it is needed for a non-chaver (someone who isn’t educated in the laws). It is obvious from logic that he requires hasra’ah, because otherwise, he would have no idea whether the action that he is doing is prohibited by the Torah, but, a chaver, who is well educated, knows very well what he is doing and understands the consequences. He shouldn’t require hasra’ah if not for the fact that the Torah would demand it as a gezeiras hakasuv. The verses are the rationale for requiring the details of hasra’ah, such as killing him within the time of an utterance (and perhaps having to accept the hasra’ah).

Based on this, he points out that Tosfos, who asks regarding the source for hasra’ah by an ir hanidachas (subverted town), is difficult. Who says that ir hanidachas has the gezeiras hakasuv requirement of hasra’ah that would involve the details? Perhaps it would only have the sevara aspect of hasra’ah to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate, so that no source is necessary. Clearly, Tosfos assumes that the type of hasra’ah necessary by ir hanidachas is the gezeiras hakasuv type - with all the details, and not just the determination that he was aware of the consequences of his actions.

The Rambam, however, doesn’t seem to follow this same approach. The Gemora 8b and 41a quote Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, who says that a Torah scholar doesn’t require hasra’ah, since the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This would imply that the Rabbis, who hold that even a Torah scholar requires hasra’ah, would hold that hasra’ah is a gezeiras hakasuv, and NOT just to distinguish between unintentional and deliberate. However, the Rambam (Sanhederin 12:2) writes: A torah scholar and an unlearned man require hasra’ah, for the sole purpose of hasra’ah is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate. This seems to be very strange. The Rambam cites the rationale of Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah, yet requires hasra’ah even for a chaver! Why?

The Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh explain that according to the Rambam, the Rabbis don’t disagree with Rabbi Yosi bar Yehudah in principal; rather, they hold that because of his concern, we require hasra’ah even by a chaver who knows the law, since he may not be aware of the action he is about to do. The Rambam clearly learns that the concept of hasra’ah is only meant to make him aware of his actions, and educate him about the halachah, not just a gezeiras hakasuv. Nevertheless, the Rambam requires hasra’ah within the time of an utterance of the action, implying that this concept isn’t merely a gezeiras hakasuv, but an actual concern that he may have a very short term memory. It seems that the Rambam doesn’t buy into the two sources for hasra’ah approach; rather, he understands that the rationale for the sources of hasra’ah cited in the Gemora is to differentiate between unintentional and deliberate - to educate and inform.

HALACHAH ON THE DAF

Eidim P’sulim

The Gemora learns that even if there are a hundred witnesses that witnessed an event, but included in those witnesses were relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses, then the all the witnesses may not testify. Rebbe clarifies that this is only true when the relatives or otherwise disqualified witnesses also gave the warning, but if they merely witnessed an event along with others, they can’t nullify the testimony of the other witnesses. Rashi explains that by giving the warning, they show that they too want to be considered witnesses, therefore they negate the other witnesses’ testimony, since part of the witnesses are disqualified.

Who is considered disqualified for testimony?

1) Relatives - Relatives: There are many different scenarios; we will only touch on a few.

We learn that relatives cannot be considered witnesses from the verse: Fathers shall not die through their sons. The Chachamim derived from this verse that the father cannot die due to testimony from his son, and vice versa. Aside from a son there are other relatives that cannot testify; a) brothers, b) grandson, c) first cousins, d) second cousins. All these cases apply to females as well, meaning a sister cannot testify on a brother and vice versa etc. (Choshen Mishpat 33:2)

If one cannot testify regarding a woman (for example a sister), he is similarly prohibited from testifying for her husband, and conversely, if one cannot testify for a certain man, he also may not testify for his wife (ibid 33:3). However, he may testify for that spouse’s relative (ibid 33:5).

Mechutanim may testify for each other (ibid 33:6).

2) Oivrei Aveirah - One Who Committed a Sin: If one transgressed any prohibition that is punishable by either death or lashes, he is disqualified for testimony until he repents. It makes no difference if he sinned due to desire, or if he sinned as an act of rebellion (ibid 34:2).

If one transgressed a Rabbinic prohibition, he is disqualified only on a Rabbinic level (there are halachic differences between them).

3) Other P’sulei Eidus: A minor is disqualified for testimony, even if he is very bright. One leaves the status of a minor once he shows signs of physical maturity, usually when he turns thirteen years old.

One who is incoherent in a certain issue is also disqualified (ibid 35:8). If he is mentally deranged, he is also disqualified (ibid 35:10).

As they Intended - Makkos Hey

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The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.

The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:
1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.
2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.

Paying and Piercing - Makkos Daled

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The Mishna stated: “We testify that this particular person owes his fellow two hundred zuz,” and they are found to be zomemin, they receive lashes and must pay, for the Scriptural verse that makes him liable for the lashes is not the same as that which makes him liable for compensation; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Chachamim say: Whoever is liable to pay does not receive lashes.

Based upon this, the Panim Yafos answers the following question: The Gemora in Kiddushin states: Why was an ear chosen (to be pierced - when a Jewish servant wishes to stay by his master even after the six years) more than other limbs of a person’s body? Hashem says that the ear that heard on Mount Sinai, “For to Me Bnei Yisroel are servants,” and not servants to servants, and he went anyway and chose a master for himself, his ear should be pierced. The question begs to be asked: If the piercing is because of his stealing, why don’t we pierce his ear immediately? Why do we wait until he wants to stay longer?

Our Gemora states that whoever is liable to pay does not receive lashes. If one is liable a punishment of lashes and money for one action, he does not receive lashes and pay, but rather, he pays and he does not incur the lashes.

Accordingly, we can say that the thief was deserving of getting his ear pierced immediately – except, since he is required to pay for that which he stole, and selling him as a servant is instead of his payment, he is therefore exempt from the piercing, for he cannot pay and receive “lashes.” However, after he served his six years, and he says, “I love my master, my wife and my children; I do not want to go free,” he is revealing to us that his serving as a servant was not a punishment for him. Retroactively, he reverts to the halachah that he should be punished for selling himself as a servant through piercing.

Lottery Ticket from Maaser and Shemittas Kesafim - Makkos gimmel

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Lottery Ticket

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Buying a lottery ticket for a charitable cause from ma’aser money

Many charitable institutions raise funds by promising prizes to be awarded in a lottery among the contributors. HaGaon Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l (Responsa Igros Moshe, O.C., IV, 76) was asked if a person could purchase such a ticket from his ma’aser money or if the ticket should be considered as having a monetary value to its holder and thus forbidden to be purchased from ma’aser.

Two types of tickets: Rav Feinstein remarks that we should divide this question into two parts – i.e., two types of lottery tickets. Some institutions issue a fixed amount of tickets, promising that at a certain date or when all of them are sold, the raffle will be held. In such a lottery even the first purchaser knows his chances of winning.

Nonetheless, there is another sort of ticket: Some institutions do not limit the amount of tickets and fix no final date for the raffle. It is obvious, then, that such tickets have no monetary value. A person who purchases such a ticket has no investment, as he has been promised nothing. It is not an investment but a form of charity and may be purchased from ma’aser.

What is the nature, though, of the first type of ticket? First of all, we must examine if we can define the value of something whose worth is unknown. In other words, is a lottery ticket regarded as an item of monetary value although the vast majority of purchasers win nothing?

Estimating the worth of an item whose value is unknown: Rav Feinstein proves from our sugya that we can regard such an article as having value. Our sugya explains that we can estimate the worth of a kesuvah of a woman who has not been divorced by examining the amount merchants would be willing to invest to purchase the rights to the kesuvah once it can be realized. The merchants examine the state of the couple’s health, their relationship and the like. They then estimate the wife’s chances to survive her husband or get divorced and earn her kesuvah. We thus see that we can regard an item whose worth is unknown as an article of monetary value. One should therefore not purchase a ticket of the first sort from ma’aser as the purchaser immediately gets the worth of his investment.

The winner of a lottery: Rav Feinstein adds that if a purchaser of the second type of ticket wins a prize, he should better return the cost of the ticket to his ma’aser money (see Derech Emunah on Matenos ‘Aniyim, Ch. 7, in Beiur Halachah, s.v. V’echad).

Reasons for Shemittas Kesafim

By: Rabbi Moshe Donnebaum

As strange as the mitzvah of relinquishing one’s loans may seem, there are important lessons in regard to this commandment. The Sefer HaChinuch explains that the first useful benefit to be gained is the characteristic of generosity. There is none so generous as he who gives without hope of receiving anything in return. So too, relinquishing a loan with no benefit or gain in mind imbues a person with this noble character trait.

The second lesson mentioned in the Chinuch relates to the mitzvah of bitachon - trust in Hashem. Anyone who, upon command, relinquishes all outstanding debts, is continuously strengthening his level of trust in Hashem. The creditor displays trust that any losses incurred will be fully reimbursed to his allocated and pre-determined wealth. The knowledge of G-d as the source of all livelihood and provider of all one’s needs is confirmed, and substantiated when releasing a debtor from his debts.

The Chinuch continues that the mitzvah of Shemittas kesafim is also a ‘barrier’ to keep away from robbery and any desire to own the possessions of one’s neighbor, via a kal vachomer. If the Torah decrees that one should leave a loan in his neighbor’s hand concerning money that is rightfully owed to him, then certainly he may not obtain his neighbor’s belongings, in any way, without his neighbor’s consent.

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Makkos, Forty and Zomemin - Daf Beis

by: Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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Makkos and Forty

The Chidah writes that he heard from an elderly mekubal that it is advantageous to study Tractate Makkos, for it is the same numerical value as “hirhurim” – “thoughts,” and it will be an assistance to those who wish to rid themselves from any impure thoughts.

It is stated in the Medrash Tanchuma that one who transgresses a negative prohibition incurs forty lashes because a person is created in forty days, and he violated the Torah which was given to Moshe in forty days.

Warning not Necessary

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

We are now learning the sugya of eidim zomemim, false witnesses who testify that they saw an act performed by a certain person and are later contradicted by others who assert that the witnesses were with them elsewhere at the time of the supposed act and could not have seen it. The false witnesses are punished with the punishment they intended to mete on the person about whom they testified. At the beginning of Makkos we should cite the explanation of HaGaon Rav Shimon Shkop zt”l about this halachah.

False witnesses are punished without being warned: A Beis Din does not punish a person unless he was warned before his act that he is about to transgress a prohibition of the Torah and will be punished accordingly. Still, false witnesses are punished without such warning (Kesuvos 33a), as the Gemora (ibid) explains, since they wanted to punish someone whom they never warned. Rambam (Hilchos ‘Edus, 20:4) adds that even unwitting false witnesses (shogegim), who did not know about the prohibition of false testimony, are punished.

Two reasons for warning: There are two reasons why we can’t punish someone without warning him: (a) He should not be considered shogeg (Makkos, 6b), unaware that he is transgressing a Torah prohibition, and (b) He should know that by his act he decrees a punishment on himself (Sanhedrin 41a and Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, 12:2; see ibid, that the transgressor must explicitly acknowledge his penalty). Apparently, the Gemora’s explanation, that we don’t have to warn false witnesses because they wanted to punish an unwarned person, means that we can punish the witnesses even though they didn’t know that they could be punished with death. Still, what is Rambam’s basis for saying that we don’t have to verify that the witnesses acted willfully (see Raavad, ibid)?

False witnesses are punished for their cruelty: Rav Shkop explains that Rambam assumes that false witnesses are not punished for transgressing but “because of their wickedness, acting against characteristic human decency. Even though they didn’t know of the prohibition by the Torah, since they knew that they were falsely incriminating a person…that is the main point of their evil…” (Chiddushei Rabbi Shim’on Yehudah HaKohen, Kesuvos, #39, and see Ketsos HaChoshen, 25, S.K. 8, and Sefer HaMafteiach as for other explanations for Rambam’s ruling).

Zomemin

By: Reb Avi Lebowitz

In a situation where two groups of witnesses contradict one another about an event; it is classified as contradictory witnesses, where we have no reason to believe one any more than the other. Under these circumstances the Gemora in Bava Basra has a discussion about what to do - it is an uncertainty, so follow the chazakah. One thing, however, is clear, that we do not believe the latter group any more than the first. However, where the second group doesn’t testify about the event, rather about the validity of the first two as being valid witnesses, such as testifying that they are thieves, the second group is completely believed to overthrow the testimony of the first group. This is not considered a novelty, since everything that the first group is saying is true, just that by believing the second group that the first are thieves, we automatically do not accept their testimony.

Rava (in the first version) holds that a zomeim is a novelty and therefore only becomes disqualified from the time of the hazamah, and not retroactively from the time of the testimony. Abaye would presumably agree with Rava that zomemin is a novelty, just that it is not logical for them to be disqualified from the time of the hazamah; therefore we disqualify them retroactively from the time of their testimony.

It seems that the concept of “novelty” by zomemin is that rather than considering it to be a case of contradictory witnesses, where the second group are merely disagreeing about the event, we consider it as if the second group are actually testifying about the character of the first group, invalidating them as witnesses. (See Tosfos who explains that the novelty of zomemin more than contradictory testimony is either that the second group is entirely believed, or that the first group is definitely disqualified, not just out of uncertainty. Assuming like Tosfos’ second approach that the novelty of zomemin is to view the testimony to be on the character of the witnesses, not on the event, in which case it is not a novelty to directly disqualify the first or to validate the second, rather it is a novelty in classification).

Why are zomemin somewhere in between? In essence, the second group is not making a character judgment; they are only contradicting the facts – “these two witnesses could not have possibly witnessed what they claim to have witnessed since they were with us elsewhere.” Had it not been for the novelty of the Torah that we believe the second group, we would view it as if they just contradicting the first group about the events, where we would have a legitimate doubt as to who to believe. We would interpret their intent as simply being that the event was not witnesses by these two witnesses because they were with us elsewhere. But the Torah teaches us that we are not to regard the hazamah as just undermining the plausibility of the event, rather they are giving a character testimony similar to claiming that the first group were thieves. Why?

It would seem that the reason is because when testifying about an event, it is sometimes possible to misinterpret the event, or not have a clear picture as to what actually happened, so we give each group the benefit of the doubt. But, by zomemin, the second group is claiming that it was clearly premeditated lying that is taking place, not an innocent mistake. People who would fabricate a story when they were in an entirely different location have a fatal character flaw just as thieves do, and therefore they are not admissible as witnesses in any court.

Eretz Yisroel - Highest Point

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Eretz Yisroel and the Beis HaMikdash is Higher than all other Places

Does High and Low Apply to Spherical Objects?

In our sugya the Gemora cites a verse in Yirmyahu (23:7) “…Who brought Bnei Yisrael up from the land of Egypt” and a verse in Devarim (17:8) “…then you shall arise and go up unto the place which the Lord thy G-d shall choose” to demonstrate that Eretz Yisrael is higher than any other land, and that the Beis HaMikdash is the highest point in Eretz Yisrael. The wording of the Gemora seems to indicate that Eretz Yisrael is physically higher. In fact, the Yam Shel Shlomo (Kiddushin Chap. 4, 1) goes so far as to say that if someone standing in Eretz Yisrael says, “I vow to go up to Chutz La’aretz,” the vow is considered to be made in vain and is invalid. Leaving Yerushalayim or Eretz Yisrael is always referred to as “going down.”

Many commentators maintain that our Gemora should not be interpreted literally. The Chasam Sofer (Responsa, Part II, Y.D. §234) stresses this point, writing, “…in fact, those who are somewhat familiar with the world map can see otherwise…actually the world is round, and high and low do not apply to spherical objects; from any given point one sees the skies high overhead and low on the horizon, forming a dome. Someone who approaches from a point on the horizon appears as if he emerged from a deep pit, and high and low do not apply.”

Furthermore the Maharal of Prague (in his book on Talmudic Aggados and in Tiferes Yosef, Chagiga 3b, s.v. Eizehu) writes that the Gemora is referring to the spiritual loftiness of Eretz Yisrael, and not to its physical height.

It is interesting to note that the Chasam Sofer (ibid) writes that Eretz Yisrael is said to be “higher than all other lands” because Creation began from the even shesiya [foundation stone] located on Har HaBayis (see Rashi, Sanhedrin 26b, s.v. veshesiya). Thus all eyes are raised to Eretz Yisrael and Har HaBayis because mankind lifts its gaze to the spot where the ground beneath its feet was first created.