Daf Yomi Insights
Arachin Daf Gimmel
INSIGHTS TO THE DAF
The Obligation Of Women To Read The Megillah
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruled: It is obligatory for women to hear the reading of the Megillah, because they benefited also by the same miracle (Haman’s decree to kill all the Jewish people included the women).
The Rishonim dispute whether a woman can read the Megillah and discharge the obligation for a man. Rashi maintains that she could and Tosfos cites a Behag that she cannot. There are those that explain the Behag that he holds that a woman is only obligated to hear the Megillah but not to read it. Rashi’s viewpoint is easily understood by the fact that the Gemora explicitly states that women are obligated in the reading of the Megillah. The Beis Yosef (O”C 689) writes that according to the Behag, the correct version in the Gemora is that women are obligated to hear the Megillah.
Mishna Berura (689:13) writes that the reason a woman cannot read the Megillah on behalf of a man is because it is similar to Kerias HaTorah, where a woman is disqualified because of public dignity.
The Eshkol offers a different explanation and states that a woman cannot read the Megillah for a man because of the prohibition of “kol b’isha ervoh.”
The Imrei Baruch explains the viewpoint of the Behag why women will only be obligated to hear the Megillah and not to read it. The Gemora below (14a) states that the prophets offered a kal vachomer argument in creating an obligation to read the Megillah. If the Jews, who were liberated from slavery in Mitzrayim and brought to freedom, sang praises to Hashem when they saw the Egyptians drowning; certainly we should commemorate our deliverance from death to life. That is why we read the Megillah publicly, where we are thanking Hashem for saving us from Haman’s decree. There is a distinction, however, between the way the men sang praise and the way the women sang. Moshe recited each phrase and all the male Jews repeated after him. The women did not sing; Miriam said each phrase and they responded with musical instruments, not with singing. According to this, we can say that the same distinction should apply by Megillah. The men, who sang songs of praise by the sea, have an obligation to read the Megillah; the women who only heard the songs of praise have an obligation to hear the Megillah, but not to read it.
Putting Tefillin on a Hat
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
Our sugya treats the prohibition of any chatzitzah – interruption, separating between the bigdei kehunah and a Kohen’s flesh, as we are told – “…and trousers of cloth he shall wear on his flesh,” interpreted by Chazal in our sugya as meaning, “nothing should interfere between it and his flesh.”
Shulchan ‘Aruch (O.C. 27:4) rules a similar halachah about tefillin: “Nothing should interfere between the tefillin and his flesh.” However, in the following paragraph Rabbi Yosef Kairo writes that for an ill person who must always cover his head, “we should allow him to place the head tefillin on the thin hat closest to his head; and he should cover it lest people see it.” Must tefillin be put on one’s skin or is it allowed to put them on a hat? It turns out that these two halachos are a sort of compromise in a difference of opinions among the Rishonim.
Our Gemora explains that the Kohanim did not don arm tefillin during their service in the Temple. They could not put the tefillin on their sleeves as the sleeve would be a chatzitzah between the tefillin and their flesh and they could not put them on under the sleeve as nothing must interrupt between the bigdei kehunah and their skin. The Rosh (Responsa, kelal 3, §4) proves therefrom that tefillin should not be put on a hat.
However, the Rashba inclines to believe that chatzitzah is not pertinent to head tefillin. In his opinion, the arm tefillin should not be put on a garment because of Chazal’s interpretation “a sign to you and not to others.” In other words, the arm tefillin should be under the garment and not on it. On the other hand, this interpretation does not apply to the head tefillin and therefore they may be put on a hat (Magen Avraham adds that if so, the arm tefillin may also be put on a garment if another garment covers them as, according to the Rashba, there is no chatzitzah in tefillin but the arm tefillin must be covered).
The two apparently contradictory paragraphs in Shulchan ‘Aruch are a compromise between the Rosh’s strict opinion and the Rashba’s lenient opinion. Therefore, Shulchan ‘Aruch rules according to the Rosh, that “nothing should interfere between the tefillin and his flesh.” But a person who cannot put on tefillin without chatzitzah may rely on the Rashba, on condition that people do not see him and learn from his custom (and he should also not pronounce a berachah on the head tefillin).
It is still not clear as to why a sick person may put tefillin only on a thin hat. Is a thin hat less of a chatzitzah than a thick one? Mishnah Berurah (S.K. 19) explains that the difference does not stem from chatzitzah but because a thick hat would interfere with the person’s putting the tefillin in their exact position on the head.
DAILY MASHAL
STORY FROM THE DAF
An amazing story is told about the exact observation of mitzvos heeded by HaGaon Rav Y.Y. Weiss zt”l, av beis din of the Eidah Chareidis in Yerushalayim and author of Minchas Yitzchak. Because of his heart ailment, the doctors left an opening in a vein in his left arm with a small pipe, such that in time of need they could inject him immediately. Rav Weiss did not agree to this chatzitzah, though he was bedridden, and every morning he removed the pipe, though this involved loss of blood and excruciating pain. During a senior doctor’s visit, Rav Weiss remarked that the injections could be performed in a different way, not involving chatzitzah. The doctor agreed and for a long while told everyone about the “rabbi professor.”
Yearning to Return to Zion
It is written [Tehillim 87:5]: And to Zion it shall be said: “this man, this man, was born in her,” and He will establish her on high. (This verse is describing the future time when all the nations of the world will bring the Jews back to Zion. They will say regarding each Jew: He is a son of Zion, he was born there, let us bring him back to her.)
Rabbi Meyasha the grandson of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said (Kesuvos 75a): This verse is applicable to any Jew that was born in Zion and one who yearns to see her. Even Jews who were born elsewhere will be considered children of Zion, provided that they learn to return there.
I began writing the following incident when I was shown that it was already printed in Daf Digest link, so I am writing their version (with a comment or two of my own).
During World War I, Palestine was under Turkish jurisdiction and the Ottomans made life very difficult for the citizens. Press gangs would roam the streets arbitrarily drafting anyone in their wake. The conditions of these forcibly drafted soldiers were exceedingly difficult. They were subjected to hard labor, and since food was exceedingly scarce they were severely underfed. These circumstances could all be circumvented by paying bribes to officials. However, there was one decree that was exceedingly difficult to avert. The Turks declared that anyone not born in Palestine would be deported. This was more difficult to deal with than forcible conscription, since the only way someone born out of the country could get around this was to lie on the government forms.
Since everyone knew that Rav Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld, zt”l,(where I saw this story brought down, it was with Rav Yosef Rogotchovi from Petach Tikva, but see below)was very careful to avoid falsehood in any form no matter what it might cost, people were afraid that he would forbid people to lie on the forms. During those difficult times, simple honesty would result in the sundering of many homes. When someone ventured to ask the Rav’s opinion about this issue, he surprised everyone in the Old Yishuv. “It is certainly permitted!”
“But why is this different from any other falsehood which the Rav prohibits?” the questioner asked.
Rav Sonnenfeld explained, “This is explicit in Kesuvos 75 on the verse, ‘And of Tzion it shall be said, each and every man is born therein.’ The Gemora learns from the redundancy of the word “man, each and every man” that one who yearns for Tzion is as one who was born there. We see clearly that any Jew who yearns for Tzion is actually considered as one who was born in Tzion! So to write of those who came up to Tzion out of longing for her holiness that they were native citizens is no lie at all: it is a declaration of the absolute truth!”
I saw this ruling from Rav Sonnenfeld in a slightly different context. It was a question regarding people who were not born in Eretz Yisroel and they were seeking permission from the courts to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The courts were only granting visas to those who were born in Eretz Yisroel. Rav Sonnenfeld ruled, based on our Gemora that not only is it permitted to testify that you were born in Eretz Yisroel, but one is obligated to do so. It is not regarded as a lie at all, since one who yearns to return to Eretz Yisroel is regarded as if he was born there.
The Kloizenberger Rebbe zt”l added the following: It is written that the lifespan of a person is seventy years. The Gemora in Shabbos (89b) states that the Heavenly courts do not administer punishment for the first twenty years of one’s life. Consequently, it can be said that the seventy years do not begin until one is twenty years old. So too, it can be said regarding one who emigrated to Eretz Yisroel. The seventy years of his life begins only after he lives in Eretz Yisroel.
This can be proven from Rashi’s commentary on the following verse [Breishis 16:3]: So Sarai, Avram’s wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her handmaid, at the end of ten years of Avram’s dwelling in the land of Canaan, and she gave her to Avram her husband for a wife. Rashi writes: This tells us that the time they dwelled outside of Eretz Yisroel does not count in the calculation.
Insights and More on Daf 11
The Lots for the Goats
The halachah that that the lot (for the two goats) does not assign the goat to Azazel unless it is fit to be the one offered to Hashem can be explained in two ways. Either, that it is a law in the assigning of the lot - to be regarded as a proper lot - they both have to be fit for the chatas which will be offered to Hashem - if one is found to be a tereifah, it is a deficient lot; or perhaps there is an inherent law that the goat being sent to Azazel must be fit to be offered as the chatas for Hashem; a tereifah is therefore disqualified from being the goat sent to Azazel, and that is why it is not considered a lot.
Rav Elchanan Wasserman in Koveitz Heoros says that a practical difference between the two explanations is if it became a tereifah after the lot. According to the first explanation it is valid because at the time of the lot it was not a tereifah. According to the second understanding, it is still invalid because the goat being sent to Azazel cannot be a tereifah.
As they Intended
The Mishna teaches us that the zomemin witnesses are only punished if they attempted to have someone executed, but they were found to be zomemin before the defendant was executed (as long as it was after the verdict was handed down). However, if they were discredited through hazamah only after the defendant had been executed, they will not be punished. This is derived from the Scriptural verse: as they intended to do; but not as they actually accomplished.
The Kesef Mishnah explains this seemingly perplexing halachah in two manners:
1. When the zomemin witnesses actually carry out their plan and the accused is executed - such a sin is of such a magnitude that they cannot get punished in this world. The punishment for such a hideous sin can only take place in the next world- in Gehinnom.
2. Alternatively, he explains, if the accused was actually executed, we assume that he was indeed guilty and deserved to die. Hashem is present by every court case and it must be attributed to Divine Providence that the second set of witnesses did not arrive until after the defendant was executed.
DAILY MASHAL
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
Most Drunkards
HaGaon Rabbi Yehonasan Eibeschitz zt”l was once asked by a gentile king why he doesn’t convert as gentiles constitute a majority as compared to the Jews. He replied that a majority is only used in case of a doubt but not when the situation is definite. Though this is true, there’s another simple answer. A hundred drunkards do not outweigh one chacham and who is like the wise of Israel who are pure of ulterior motives? (HaGaon E. Wasserman, Beiurei Agadaos ‘al Derech HaPeshat).
From Sacrifices
to Honoring One’s Father
The source of the halachah of the majority stems from sacrifices, which are offered without worrying about treifos. Maharal Tzintz writes that it is possible that we can thus explain the verse “And you will sanctify him for he offers the bread of your G-d” (Vayikra 21:8). You should sanctify the kohen and if you have a doubt if he is a kohen lest his declared father is not his true father (see Chulin 11b: “…and maybe he is not his father”), the answer is “for he offers the bread of your G-d” – learn from sacrifices that we should follow the majority and if so, he’s certainly his father and you should sanctify him (Melo Ha’Omer).
Who Distinguishes Between the Holy and the Mundane
Our sugya says that the two goats of Yom Kippur, the chatas and the goat for Azazel, must be equal. This teaches us that the holy and the mundane are likely to be equal, almost without any difference. How much must we concentrate to know what is holy and what is mundane! (Leket Amarim).
Chullin Daf Beis
Tractate Chulin: Hakol Shochatin
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
With Hashem’s help we have finished Menachos and now we pass from the realm of kodshim to the realm of chullin - the mundane. Chullin is one of the longest tractates in the Talmud and its sugyos treat practical and most important subjects. It is one of the most varied tractates as it addresses a number of utterly different topics and therefore learners find much interest and satisfaction because of the many concepts they discover.
The tractate before us: First we shall learn the details of slaughtering, without which an animal is a neveilah. In the third chapter we shall learn about the signs of treifah and the signs of kashrus of land animals, fish and locusts. In the next chapter we shall complete different details of the topics learnt in the previous chapters and especially concerning the embryo of a slaughtered animal (ben peku’ah) and the impurity of a neveilah. Further on, the chapters are full of different subjects accompanying slaughtering and kashrus. In Chapter 5 we shall examine the details of the negative mitzvah not to slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day and in the next chapter we shall explore the mitzvah to cover up the blood of a slaughtered wild animal or fowl. In Chapter 7 we shall learn about the prohibition of gid hanasheh and Chapter 8 is devoted to the prohibition of meat and milk. In these chapters we shall also become aware of the great questions of mixtures. The halachos of a limb from a live animal and the impurity of a neveilah are detailed in Chapter 9 and in Chapter 10 and 11 we shall learn halachos concerning gifts to kohanim. The final chapter addresses the mitzvah of shiluach haken (chasing away a mother bird before taking its eggs).
After we finish chullin, we shall again learn about kodshim. chullin is like an island of matters of mundane meat among the tractates dealing with kodshim and some say that it is therefore called chullin or Shechitas chullin, as Rashi often calls it. Rambam (in the preface to his commentary on the Mishnah) explains that chullin was placed after Zevachim and Menachos because the Torah also treats the halachos of sacrifices and then addresses eating mundane meat: “Yet as much as you desire you shall slaughter and eat meat” (Devarim 12:15).
Who is fit to be a shochet?
In the first paragraph of the first chapter of Yoreh De’ah the Remo details who is fit to serve as a shochet: “He shouldn’t slaughter, though he is an expert and knows the halachos of shechitah, till he slaughters three times before a chacham expert in the halachos of shechitah, so that he knows that he is expert and will not faint (Tur in the name of Rambam). Therefore, we are accustomed that no one slaughters unless he received a kabalah (approval to slaughter) from a chacham. The chacham does not grant him a kabalah unless he knows that he knows the halachos of shechitah and is expert with his hands. Therefore we are accustomed to rely on anyone who comes to slaughter (that he surely received a kabalah)… and in some places they have the custom to be stricter, that the recipient takes a written kabalah as proof. Every shochet, though he has a kabalah, should review the halachos of shechitah from time to time, that he should be expert in them not to forget them (Rav Yaakov HaLevi in the name of the Maharash). The same applies to the halachos of examining the lungs and to the bodeik - the person who examines - their halachah and custom are equal in this entire matter. And the beis din should inspect the bodekim and shochetim to see that they should be expert and kosher (Mahariu, 50) for the hazard of any transgression concerning shechitah and bedikah, accessible to everyone, is immense.”
How often must he review of the halachos of shechitah: When the Remo said “from time to time”, he meant that a shochet should review the halachos every month! (Baer Heiteiv, S.K. 8). Beer HaGolah wrote in the Maharil’s name that during the first 30 days of his position a shochet should review the halachos of slaughtering and examination every day. After the first 30 days he should review them every 30 days and when he completes his first year, he should review them once in a while but if he doesn’t do so, his slaughtering is disqualified!
ShUB: shochet ubodek: It has always been known that a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person and the title Shub, the initials of shochet ubodek is a source of pride to many, such that some adopted it as their family name. The need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing slaughterer is not mere stringency but concerns the basic halachos of slaughtering, as follows.
The three phases of shechitah: The process of rendering an animal fit to eat by shechitah consists of three phases: (1) examining the knife, (2) slaughtering, (3) examining the lungs.
Examining the knife: Rabeinu Yonah writes in his Sha’arei Teshuvah (sha’ar 3, os 96) that examining the knife demands extreme scrupulous care: “And regarding someone who is not conscientious, his heart will not understand to be meticulous about examining the knife for he must greatly concentrate all his attention on his examination. You will see that a person sometimes checks two or three times without detecting a slight fault and then he finds it, for he concentrated the last time.” Indeed, the task of examining the knife was given to the chacham or Rabbi and a shochet who didn’t show his knife to the Rabbi before slaughtering would be ostracized (chullin 18a)! Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 18:17) maintains that in later eras the custom arose to appoint special people for this task and the Rabbi relinquishes his honor to them as they are scrupulously careful. In fact, the author of Shulchan Aruch HaRav (18, Kuntres Acharon, S.K. 9) maintains that the Rabbanim only relinquished their honor for G-d-fearing people but others are not allowed to examine knives!
Slaughtering: One witness is believed regarding prohibitions (chullin 10b), as opposed to halachos of property and marriage, which require at least two witnesses. According to the Reem, one witness is still not believed to testify that an animal was properly slaughtered as, opposing his testimony there is a chazakah (previous knowledge) of prohibition to eat the (unslaughtered) animal, and one witness is not believed against a chazakah. Only a witness known to be faithful and kosher may testify (Mordechai, chullin, §579). There is therefore a need for a G-d-fearing shochet because otherwise, if he slaughtered an animal alone, he is not believed to testify that he slaughtered it properly. We emphasize that the Reem’s opinion was not accepted as halachah (see Pri Megadim in the preface and „Aroch HaShulchan, 4). But all the poskim repeatedly warn that we must eat from the shechitah of a G-d-fearing and scrupulous shochet, as Baer Heiteiv asserts (S.K. 29): “Not to give a kabalah to anyone who is frivolous but only to the G-d-fearing.”
Examining the lungs: An examination of the lungs is conducted to eliminate the possibility of a hole or another disorder of the lung, rendering the animal treifah. Though most animals are not treifah, one must examine the lungs because of the frequency of treifos (Shach, ibid) and Shulchan Aruch warns (Y.D. 39:1): “Anyone who breaches the fence - to eat without examination - should be bitten by a snake.”
Only the G-d-fearing may be lenient: Regarding two types of suspected treifah that could occur in a lung, Shulchan Aruch states (ibid, se’if 11 and 13) that in certain instances we may be lenient but he limits his statement: “We rely on this leniency only in case of an outstandingly G-d-fearing and kosher examiner.” We thus see that the need for an outstandingly G-d-fearing ShuB is essential, as otherwise one must not be lenient.
DAILY MASHAL
A Fast
The Chasam Sofer zt”l decreed a fast in his yeshivah before learning chullin according to Sefer Chasidim (261 and 1012; Mekor Chesed on Sefer Chasidim, 261, remark 6). Some believe that the reason is because of the danger that arises when a person demonstrates the matters of slaughtering and treifos on his own body (Sichas chullin in the preface, according to the Maharsha, Gitin, end of 57b).
What Is an Outstandingly G-d-fearing Person?
As explained in the article “Who Is Fit to Slaughter”, a shochet must be an outstandingly G-d-fearing person (yerei shamayim meirabim). People say in the name of the Belzer Rebbe that an outstandingly G-d-fearing person means that he must practice every stringency practiced by two people in his town as the least number of rabim (many) is two!
Join the “NEW” Kedushas Tefillin Project - Daf 35
by R’ Zev Busel
ליהודים היתה אורה ושמחה וששן ויקר - the Yidden experienced light and joy, delight and honor. The Gemora in Meseches Megillah tells us that (more…)
Daily Mashal - Zevachim 90
This is the Law of an Olah
It is noteworthy that after the Torah discusses the korban that a rich woman who has given birth brings, it says [Vayikra 12:7]: This is the law of a woman who gives birth to a male or to a female. The question is asked: Immediately following this verse, the Torah teaches us the korbanos that a poor woman who has given birth brings. Why would the Torah say regarding the rich woman’s korbanos that “this is law of a woman who gives birth”? It would seem from the verse that only the rich woman’s korbanos are the law, and not the korbanos from the poor woman.
The Kli Chemdah (Parshas Tazria) cites a Gemora in Menochos (110a): It is written: This is the law of an olah. The Gemora expounds: Anyone that studies the laws of an olah is considered as if he brought a korban olah. What would be if a poor person would recite the portion dealing with the rich person’s korbanos? Would it be regarded as if he brought the korban? The answer may be gleaned from the fact that the Torah concluded the portion dealing with the rich woman’s korbanos with the following verse: This is the law of a woman who gives birth. The Torah is informing us that the recital of this portion is sufficient for anyone, even for a poor woman.
[The Gemora states that Hashem told Avraham Avinu that whenever Klal Yisroel will read the Torah portions pertaining to the korbanos, it will be regarded as if they brought korbanos and their sins will be forgiven.
The commentators discuss if this concept applies by other mitzvos as well. Perhaps it can be said that the studying of any mitzvah that cannot be performed nowadays will be regarded as if one fulfilled the mitzvah.
The Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemora in Bava Metzia (114b) that the Amoraim were fluent in Seder Kodoshim in the same manner as Seder Moed, Nashim and Nezikin. This is because Kodoshim was relevant to them since the learning about the korbanos was regarded as if they actually brought a korban. Implicit in his words that for some reason this was only true regarding Seder Kodoshim and not to Seder Zeroim or Taharos which also has many halachos that do not apply outside of Eretz Yisroel and after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdosh.
The Taz in his sefer Divrei Dovid maintains that the concept applies to all mitzvos and one who studies the laws of Zeraim, it will be regarded as if he gave terumos and ma’asros to the kohanim and levi’im and it will be considered as if he gave all the presents to the poor people. This is the explanation in Yaakov’s words to Esav "Im Lavan garti," which Chazal understand to mean that Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos in Lavan’s house. There were many mitzvos that he was not able to fulfill at that time; it is evident that the studying of these mitzvos are regarded as if he fulfilled them all.
The Ben Ish Cahi explains the verse in Nitzavim: "Ki Korov eilecha hadavar meod b’ficha u’vilvov’cha la’asoso." It is possible to fulfill all the mitzvos with your mouth (by studying them) even those mitzvos that you cannot actually perform.]
The Order of Serving Hashem
Our Gemora explains that a chatas should be sacrificed before an „olah but that the Torah put the verses of the „olah before those of the chatas because “for its reading, the Torah gave precedence to it”. Rashi (s.v. Lemikraah) comments: “that it should be read in the subject (of offerings) first” and Tosfos wonder (s.v. Lemikraah): “What kind of chidush is this?” HaGaon Rav Eliyahu Dessler zt”l writes that we can explain Rashi thus: In the order of sacrifices – i.e., in the practical phases of serving Hashem, the chatas – the rectification of sins – precedes the „olah – achieving high levels. But “for its reading” – i.e., to know and perceive high levels – “the Torah gave precedence to it” as even before the sinner finishes rectifying his sins, he should be familiar with all the levels. One cannot serve Hashem from a narrow viewpoint but one must be aware of all the stages of serving Hashem and the high levels that one must strive to achieve (Michtav MeEliyahu, III 174).
Miracle of the fire - Zevachim 89
Our Mishna says that one must first burn the limbs of an ‘olah and then the parts of a chatas. At the inauguration of the altar in the Sanctuary, the Torah says that they put the ‘olah on the altar and, above it, the parts of the other sacrifices (Vayikra 9). But when the fire came out from before Hashem and “consumed on the altar”, the verse says that it consumed the “’olah and the fats.” In other words, first the fire burned the ‘olah and then the fats above the ‘olah! The Netziv writes that this was a miracle to observe the halachah that the limbs of an ‘olah are burnt before the parts of other sacrifices (Ha’amek Davar, Shemini).
Ramps to the Mishkan - Zevachim 62
Subscribe to the Daily Daf Notes here
Rav Yehudah said: Two small ramps branched off from the main ramp, by which one (on the west side) turned to the base and one (on the east side) to the ledge, and these were also separated from the altar by a hairsbreadth, because it is written: around.
HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, notes: This is referring to the altar in the Beis HaMikdash. It is logical to assume that there would also be one to the ledge in the Mishkan if the ledge in the Mishkan was for the Kohanim to walk upon. According to Rashi in Chumash there was no ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan, so there was no need for a small ramp to the ledge. There are commentators that maintain that there was a ledge for the Kohanim to walk on in the Mishkan (page 234), so according to them there was a need for a small ramp to the ledge.
Regarding if in the Mishkan there was a small ramp to the base, according to what Shitah Mekubetzes (letter 12) that the purpose of the small ramp to the base was because if the Kohen would have to go down the ramp and then go to the base, the blood might coagulate and become unfit for sprinkling, it would seem that there should also be one in the Mishkan. Even though it would seem that the ramp in the Mishkan was a little shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, it is not logical to say that since the ramp in the Mishkan was a few amos shorter than the ramp in the Beis HaMikdash, there would be no concern that the blood would coagulate. According to what we have written, it seems that there was only one small ramp in the Mishkan,
Traveling with the Fire on the Altar - Zevachim 61
The Gemora says that the fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Moshe did not depart from the copper Altar until the time of Shlomo. The fire that came down from the heavens during the time of Shlomo did not depart until Menashe and removed it.
Kollel Iyun HaDaf <a href=”http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm”>http://www.dafyomi.co.il/zevachim/insites/zv-dt-061.htm</a> poses the following question: Rashi in his commentary on Chumash (Shemos 30:3) cites the Mechilta which contrasts the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores to the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes. The verse says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Ketores had a solid top, while, says the Mechilta, the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did not have such a top. The Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes was transported merely as a frame, and at each stop in the desert its hollow interior was filled with dirt. The Netziv (Shemos 27:2) therefore questions Rashi’s words from the Gemora here, which states that the fire descended and stayed on the Mizbe’ach. If the earth inside of the hollow of the Mizbe’ach was removed and the Mizbe’ach dismantled each time the Jewish people embarked on a new journey, then where was the fire?
HaRav Dovid Meyers, author of the fabulous sefer on the construction of the Mishkan, Meleches HaMishkan V’Kailav, answers as follows: Firstly, according to the Malbim (Shemos 20, posuk 21) there is an argument in Mechilta whether the Mizbe’ach was carried with the dirt or not. The Malbim also brings another dispute if the fire was on the Mizbe’ach when they traveled or not. The Malbim explains that if the fire remained, then the Mizbe’ach was filled with dirt when they carried it. If it did not remain, then it was carried without dirt.
According to the Shitah Mekubetzes on our Daf (letter 6), in the time they traveled, the fire rested on the edge of the Mizbe’ach.
According to Raaviah (chelek sheini Maseches Chagigah siman 808), the fire rested on a clump of dirt carried with the Mizbe’ach.
According to Anaf Yosef on Tanchuma (Terumah 11) they put a tablet on the Mizbe’ach and it rested on it.
According to Tosafos HaSaleim (Shemos 38, 6-7, letter 1), even according to Rashi, the Mizbe’ach HaNechshes had a top.
The Kollel cites the following answers: The Netziv explains that the Gemora argues with the Mechilta and maintains that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes did have a top on which the fire rested even during the journeys. He finds support for this assertion in the Midrash Tanchuma. He explains that the way the Mizbe’ach was filled with earth was through the bottom of the Mizbe’ach, which had no floor. Upon their arrival at a new location, the Jewish people would make a mound of earth and place the Mizbe’ach over it, effectively filling the Mizbe’ach with earth. When they would leave, they would lift the Mizbe’ach, leaving the earth in its place.
This also seems to be the opinion of the Kereisi u’Pleisi (43:5). The Gemora in Chagigah (27a) derives through a kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav that the fire of Gehinom does not affect the transgressors among the Jewish people. Even though the gold covering the top of the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was only the thickness of a dinar coin, it was not diminished at all throughout the years that it had a fire burning on it. Certainly, then, the transgressors among the Jewish people — who are full of mitzvos like a pomegranate — will not be affected by the fire of Gehinom (see Insights to Chagigah 27a).
Tosfos in Chagigah there (DH she’Ein) is bothered by a question, as the Kereisi u’Pleisi explains his words. Why does the Gemora learn this kal va’chomer from the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav, and not from the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes? The only thing offered on the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav was the incense offering, which was burned there once at the beginning of the day and once at the end of the day. There was much more activity on the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes, which had a fire on it at all times, and it too had a coating of gold that did not diminish!
Since the Kereisi u’Pleisi says that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had a coating of gold on its top, it is clear that he maintains that the Mizbe’ach had a top, like its counterpart, the Mizbe’ach ha’Zahav.
The Gemora here may be understood even according to Rashi’s assertion that the Mizbe’ach ha’Nechoshes had no top, based on the words of the Shitah Mekubetzes (#6). Rashi here (DH Lo Nistalkah) comments that while the Jewish people traveled in the desert, they used to turn a certain type of vessel over the fire on the Mizbe’ach to preserve the fire. This is the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah in Toras Kohanim (Tzav 2:10; see Rash mi’Shantz), and not the opinion of Rebbi Shimon who says that the fire was removed from the Mizbe’ach. This is also the way Rashi explains in Bamidbar (4:13), where he says that the cover of the Mizbe’ach was not burned by the fire underneath it while traveling, due to the vessel which was placed over the fire. If there was no actual top to the Mizbe’ach, though (but rather its frame was filled to the top with earth), and the earth inside of it was removed when the people traveled, where could they place the vessel to contain the fire? The Shitah Mekubetzes explains that they placed the vessel “over the edge” of the Mizbe’ach. This means that the fire on the Mizbe’ach remained on top of the frame of the Mizbe’ach, covered by this vessel.
Eighty Replies to One Question - Zevachim 47
By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi
and Many of our Subscribers
Our Gemora states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes piggul. In his opinion, not only a Kohen can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of piggul (that it will be eaten not in its proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.
A question that originated in the beis midrash of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his Sedei Chemed, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding talmidei chachamim in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work Gevuros Shemonim which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of Beis HaOtzar, Asvan D’oraisa, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.
The question: If the owner causes piggul, we cannot test a sotah (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the Kohen has to offer the minchah (Sotah 23a, s.v. Kol) that she must bring. The sotah, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the minchah to be piggul and without offering the minchah, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that piggul can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that piggul is caused only by speech, the sotah can be prevented from saying anything.
She can be taken out of the ‘Azarah: The fifth of the 80 answers is based on Tosfos (above, 29a, s.v. Lamakom), who assert that a thought of piggul disqualifies a sacrifice only in the ‘Azarah. If so, the sotah can be taken out of the ‘Azarah while the minchah is offered. To force her to say the opposite: In the 37th answer, Rav Engel advises that the woman be forced to say explicitly that the minchah will be eaten in its proper time and place. From then on, even if she thinks frantically that it should be piggul, she cannot disqualify anything (according to Pesachim 63a).
The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our sugya (s.v. Shama’ti), that the owner causes piggul only if the Kohen remains silent. But if the Kohen announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause piggul.
Piggul applies only to shelamim and todos: Rav Zeev Yitzchak HaLevi Dünner of Germany offered the answer that the owner can cause piggul only concerning shelamim and todos, whose meat they eat, but not regarding an asham, chatas orminchah, of which they do not partake (and see ibid, answer 4).
It would appear that the concept of the owner causing piggul is not relevant to the sotah’s minchah. The Gemora (36a; see Rashi ad loc. s.v. Hachi Garsinan Lishna Acharina) says that piggul, which entails intending to eat or burn the korban at the wrong time, only applies if the one causing the piggul can actually do it at the wrong time. But if he himself cannot, intending that others will do it at the wrong time is meaningless. Accordingly, the halachah that the owner can cause piggul would only apply to shelamim and the like, where the owner will indeed be eating the meat, so it is up to him to intend to eat it at the wrong time. But when it comes to the minchah, the woman will not be burning the minchah, nor will she be eating it. All she can do is intend that the Kohen burn or eat it at the wrong time, and that is meaningless.
Let’s remember that the woman is not the sole owner, as the husband is the one “sponsoring” the korban for her, which has many halachic ramifications. Accordingly, it is quite likely that the husband is the one who would have the jurisdiction over the piggul, just as we see in Bava Kama Daf 13a-b that when one person sponsors a korban for another, the sponsor is entitled to the meat.
Rashi writes that the owner can render it piggul if the Kohen had no intent, implying that if the Kohen explicitly intended the proper thought, the owner’s thought would not count. This makes sense, considering that the source for the owner’s power to cause piggul is that he too is called a makriv, but as a makriv, he is definitely secondary to the Kohen. Accordingly, in the case of the sotah, the solution is to ensure that the Kohen specifically intends the right thought.
The most obvious answer seems to be that she cannot overpower the intention of the Kohen doing the avodah. You will note that Rashi says that the owner can cause piggul if he has piggul intention and the Kohen kept quiet. From here it seems that if the Kohen has an active intention the owner’s intention cannot take effect.
Perhaps, since it’s not b’yadah to eat it chutz l’zmano or to be makriv it chutz l’mkomo, she cannot make it piggul.
The Torah says that the husband shall bring her to the Kohen, and therefore it’s his korban not hers.
Perhaps because she would benefit personally from piggul, therefore she does not have believability.
Only an innocent woman will actually drink the waters, so as to prove her innocence. Accordingly, she wouldn’t cause it to become piggul.
The Torah says (Bamidbor 5,15) “Veheivi”, which means that the husband brings the minchah, so what makes the wife the owner? And even if the waving (of the minchah) is done by the wife, so what? The Kohen had to do the waving with her as well so he is the owner as well?
In Sotah 19, the Chachamim say (and so is the halachah) that first she drinks and then they start with the minchah. There was no chance to cause piggul before drinking, and R’ Shimon says the minchah was first, but who says that he agrees with Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi?
It would seem to me that if she deliberately has machsheves piggul, she would not be believed to say so since ain odom maysim atzmo rasha. (I assume it is forbidden to deliberately invalidate a korban, and especially to prevent them from fulfilling dinei sotah). The only possible case is if the person says he accidentally had machsheves piggul.
Who said the woman is the owner of the korban. Perhaps it’s being brought for her, not by her, and she can’t cause the piggul.
If we’re concerned that she’ll try to get out of drinking she could do it in an easier way by admitting she was guilty. This would forbid her to her husband, but no death penalty.
Who said the wife is the owner of the minchah? Doesn’t the husband pay for it and have to “bring her”? Isn’t he the owner?
The first though that occurs to me is whether in fact the korban minchah prevents the sotah from drinking, or is it considered a separate and distinct aspect of the overall process, so that even if it invalidated it, she could still drink?
There is a halachah that if the accused sotah declares that she will not drink, then the korban minchah must be burned. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, if she is completely silent, we need not be concerned with the possibility of her having a piggul thought, since she did not verbally refuse to drink. Obviously, she feels that she is innocent, and is willing to do ahead with the entire process - including both a proper hakravah of the korban and the drinking.
Rashi there says ‘if the Kohen is quiet while being mekabel…’ – this sounds like the only then does the owner capable of rendering it piggul. Therefore here where there is a concern we’ll just have the Kohen speak out the correct time and day… and therefore even the Rambam will agree that her intention cannot override or have any impact to the Kohen’s expression.
Do we see anywhere that we suspect someone to deliberately render something piggul – is it not kares?
If there is this concern then R’ Chaim Berlin should ask more – how can the Kohen continue to do the different avodah’s on an animal which is suspect to be piggul?
Saying Eizehu Mekoman before Prayer
For very many years it has been the custom to say the Mishna of our chapter, Eizehu mekoman, before shacharis. The Tur (O.C. 50) bases the custom on the halachah that every day one should learn Torah (Written), Mishna and Talmud (Kiddushin 30a). Therefore we say the parashah of the tamid and the verses dealing with the sacrifices for the portion of Torah, Eizehu mekoman for Mishna and Rabbi Yishmael’s braisa for the portion of Talmud. Our chapter was chosen from the 524 chapters of Mishna because the Gemora in Menachos 110a praises those who learn about sacrifices (see Perishah, ibid, S.K. 2 and 4).
Beis Yosef (ibid) cites another reason in the name of the Raah: “because there is no disagreement in the whole chapter and it is a clear Mishna handed down from Moshe from Mount Sinai”. In other words, this chapter does not contain even one difference of opinions and therefore we assume that it has been handed down from Moshe in its present form (Peninim Mishulchan HaGra, end of Shemos, and the Noda’ BiYeudah wrote likewise in Doresh LeTziyon, derush 11). Some also prove thus from the phrasing of the Mishna in this chapter, which evidences its antiquity, as we are told: “…and they are eaten within the curtains (kla’im)”. Curtains were not in the Temple but in the Sanctuary (mishkan). Therefore, the Tanaim did not formulate this Mishna but it originates from the generation of the desert (see Otzar HaTefilos, p. 81 in the remark, and Tiferes Yisrael on our chapter, os 22). ‘Ateres Zekeinim on Shulchan ‘Aruch (ibid) states that the words of this chapter amount to 344 and when we add 1 for reading, we arrive at the numerical equivalent for Moshe – a hint that this chapter was given to Moshe at Mount Sinai in its present phrasing.
Is it really true, many wondered, that there is no difference of opinions in the chapter? Our Gemora explains that the Mishna’s statement, that the pesach is eaten only till midnight, is only according to Rabbi Elozar ben Azaryah and not according to Rabbi Akiva (see Pri Megadim, ibid, in Eishel Avraham, and see Yeshu’as Ya’akov, S.K. 1). Indeed, the Ritva, the great pupil of the Raah, indicates (Avodah Zarah 19b) that Raah did not mean that this chapter was given to Moshe in its present form but “since the whole chapter is learnt with no difference of opinions mentioned at all, it should be learnt more than other chapters”.
HaGaon Rav Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, who expands on the topic (Responsa Tzitz Eli’ezer, IX, 5), cites the reason of Orchos Chayim (Dinei Meah Berachos, os 16), that this chapter includes the secret of all the sacrifices. Yesod Veshoresh Ha’Avodah says: “A person scrutinizing the writings of the Ari z”l will realize its great import, that every Mishna of this chapter is a rectification (tikun) in itself in the high worlds” (see Tzitz Eli’ezer, ibid).
To conclude, we should mention the statement of Rabbi Shneiur Zalman of Lyadi zt”l (Responsa HaGraz, 1:9), that as saying Eizehu mekoman before prayer was mainly instituted so that a person should learn something each day, a person “who can learn and understand does not have to say the parashah of the sacrifices each day but to say it sometimes suffices”.
DAILY MASHAL
How Could You Write a Book on Eizehu Mekoman?
A person who wrote a commentary on Eizehu mekoman came with his book to Rebbe Baruch of Mezhbuzh for an approbation. The Rebbe replied, “I wonder how you could write such a commentary. When I come to this chapter, I begin to imagine bringing sacrifices to the Temple and the service of the kohanim. My stomach turns over and I’m full of tribulations and suffering” (Ma’yanah shel Mishna).
What Is a Sacrifice?
Our Mishna says “What is the place of the sacrifices?” – i.e., all the sacrifices. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra writes in his commentary on the Torah (Shemos 20:20): “I saw an apostate…who challenged the chachamim because they said „What is the place of the sacrifices (zevachim)‟. He said that in all the Torah he found zevichah referring only to shelamim, such as „‘olah uzevachim as an ‘olah is a thing for itself and the zevachim are shelamim, as in „…and they offered ‘olos and slaughtered zevachim shelamim” (Shemos 24:5) and thus we find everywhere. I showed him that he wasn’t speaking correctly as we are told: „…and you will slaughter (vezavachta) on it your ‘olos and shelamim.” He then admitted to his sin…that he had disputed men greater than all following generations”
Sh’vuos 16 - Story on the Daf - Walled City
The Gemora states that the terms Mishkan and Mikdash are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term Mishkan or always using the term Mikdash. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.
Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rand the doorbell one evening at the Miller’s home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller’s family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, “Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?”
Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. “I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time,” Rabbi Stein said. “The opposite is true,” declared Mr. Miller. “Let me share with you something.
Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving tzedakah. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give tzedakah, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time.”
This story teaches us that there is a Mikdash, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a Mishkan, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of tzedakah, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.
Sent out of a Walled City
The Gemora mentions that there is a special sanctity regarding cities in Eretz Yisroel that were surrounded by a wall in the times of Yehoshua. Rashi writes some of these halachos: One who sells a house inside a walled city has one year to redeem the house, but if he chooses not to redeem the house, it becomes the property of the buyer permanently; sending a metzora outside the city; and that the open space (1,000 cubits) surrounding the city should be left uncultivated.
Why does a Metzora need to leave a city that is surrounded by a wall, but may otherwise remain in all other cities–as long as they are unwalled? The Be’er Yosef provides a fascinating p’shat based on the Chazal in Erachin (15b) which states that Hashem provided for the tongue two protections — two walls: one of flesh–the lips, and one of bone–the teeth. A metzora breached his very own walls of protection by speaking lashon hora; he cannot therefore remain in a city protected by a wall!
Hakhel Note: An average city has only one wall–yet Hashem in his benevolence gives us a truly enhanced fortification–a dual safeguard! How can a person be so imprudent, so unwise, so as to take down not only one wall made for his own protection–but two! We will add one other point, as well. One of the most famous Metzora scenes in Tanach is that of Gechazi and his sons outside the city of Shomron (the Haftorah for Parshas Metzora)–perhaps a lesson to us that the sin of Lashon Hora is easily spread within or among a family(Miriam and Aharon speaking regarding Moshe Rabbeinu provides a similar lesson)–and this may be why it is easier to succeed at taking down the ‘double wall’–it is an unfortunate and misguided team effort, and one family member encourages the next in what to the casual observer may otherwise be described as a self-defeating struggle. If one sees a weakness in his family–or in a particular family member (even if that family member is himself) — he should bolster the fortifications–so that the security of the entire family is not breached–and the lips and tongue can take their noble places in protecting home, life and family!