With pinpoint airstrikes on terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip and Iranian-made rockets flying deep into Israel, the current conflagration between Israel and Hamas reflects the vast changes that have taken place on the battlefield in just four years.
Israel, armed with precise intelligence and newly developed munitions, has carried out hundreds of surgical airstrikes in a campaign meant to hit terrorists hard while avoiding the civilian casualties that have marred previous offensives.
Hamas, meanwhile, has not been stopped from firing its new longer-range rockets that shocked Israelis by reaching the areas around Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for the first time, and has revealed a variety of new weapons.
This battle zone is the result of meticulous efforts by both sides to beef up their abilities since the three-week Israeli offensive in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead, that ended in January 2009.
At that time, Israel inflicted heavy damage on Hamas. But the operation caused widespread damage to the civilian infrastructure and killed hundreds of civilians. The heavy toll drew heavy international criticism and war crimes accusations, despite Israeli protestations that the Islamic terrorist group was responsible by using schools and residential areas for cover. Thirteen Israelis also were killed in the fighting.
In four days of fighting, Israel has sought to hit clear terrorist targets – relying on painstaking intelligence gathered through a network of informers, aerial surveillance and other high-tech measures.
Israeli military officials say greater coordination between military intelligence and the Shin Bet security service has allowed deeper infiltration into Hamas ranks and quick decision-making on airstrikes.
An arsenal of high-flying drones constantly hovering above Gaza provides a live picture of movements on the ground.
Other technological means used to avoid collateral damage include specially designed munitions with smaller blowback, a system of sending text messages and automated phone calls to warn residents to vacate areas ahead of strikes, and stun explosives that are deployed to create large explosive sounds to scare off civilians before the real payload is deployed against terrorists. The officials described the tactics on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information.
However, the room for error is small. Of the 46 Palestinians killed in the current offensive, 15 have been civilians, according to Palestinian medical officials. In addition, more than 400 civilians have been wounded, the officials say. Israel knows that a single misfire resulting in high numbers of civilian deaths could quickly turn international opinion against it.
The results of the new Israeli tactics were illustrated at the outset of the offensive, when Israel assassinated Hamas’ military chief, Ahmed Jabari, in an airstrike in Gaza City.
In a black and white video released by the military, a car carrying Jabari moves slowly along a narrow road before exploding into flames, sending a large chunk of the vehicle flying skyward without injuring bystanders.
Since then, the Israelis have carried out hundreds of surgical airstrikes against weapon depots, launching pads and other targets. On Saturday morning, a massive airstrike flattened the headquarters of Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh but caused little damage to buildings directly adjacent to it. Curious children quickly arrived to inspect the aftermath.
“Many of the targets that we targeted from the air were in very densely populated areas. Sometimes they were even near U.N. facilities or schools or recreation centers,” said military spokeswoman Lt. Col. Avital Leibovich. “This leads us to develop and use very precise ammunitions to minimize casualties … they know Israel has a soft spot when it comes to civilian casualties. We have improved significantly in the area.”
Uzi Dayan, a former general and national security adviser, said Israeli intelligence had been tracking Hamas individuals and locations for years, waiting patiently for the opportune moment to attack.
“When you discover a place, you don’t strike it immediately. You track it, observe it and wait,” he said. “Over time, these targets add up.”
Another tool is recruiting informers. The task has become harder since Israeli forces withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and lost the immediate interaction with its assets. But the Shin Bet is still prolific in recruiting Palestinians imprisoned in Israel or those who travel to Israel for medical procedures.
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